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[The national income]  
is divided among three classes,  
[rentiers, capitalists and labour] …,  
[in the form of] rents, profits, and wages. 
 To determine the laws  
which regulate this distribution,  
is the principal problem in Political Economy 
David Ricardo 
 
Inequality is a choice 
Joseph Stiglitz 
 
I am my choices 
Jean-Paul Sartre 
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1  Cambridge University and USACH (http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/people/emeritus/jgp5).  
I am especially grateful to Alex Cobham and Andy Sumner for their invaluable 
contributions to my work on inequality.  I am also thankful to many friends and colleagues, 
in particular to Javier Núñez and the great old gang of Cambridge PhD students for their 
contributions to my work on this subject.  Over the years, Stephanie Blankenburg, Ha-Joon 
Chang, Mariana Chudnovsky, Camila Cosiña, Jonathan DiJohn, Jorge Fiori, Juliano Fiori, 
Daniel Hahn, Geoff Harcourt, Pamela Jervis, Mushtaq Khan, José Antonio Ocampo, 
Cristóbal Palma, Guillermo Paraje, Carlota Pérez, Jonathan Pincus, Ashwani Saith, Ignês 
Sodré, Bob Sutcliffe, Lance Taylor and Robert Wade also made important contributions.  
The usual caveats apply.  
This paper is dedicated to Diego Armando Maradona, “El Pelusa”, a symbol of our 
Latin American culture in all its glories and flaws ―in its life-producing drives and its self-
destructiveness (the subject matter of this paper is no exception).   
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Introduction  
This paper studies the complex and intriguing issue of why the rich tend to stay 
rich, no matter what the rest of society throws at them. To do so, I return to the 
Ricardian tradition of understanding the distribution of income as the outcome of 
the political articulation of conflict between rentiers, capitalists, bureaucrats and 
labour ―in which history, politics and institutions matter as much (if not more) 
than economic ‘fundamentals’.  Also, in this tradition economic underperformance 
arises mostly from the shift in distribution from entrepreneurs to rentiers (from 
operating profits to rents).  The focus of the analysis is on the persistence and 
change of institutions in Latin America’s recent past, in particular on the “iron law 
of oligarchies”, whereby dysfunctional institutions tend to rebuild (with Chile as a 
case study). 
In the US, for example, as Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) describe, the 
traditional landed élites were able to sustain their political control of the South for 
at least a century after losing the Civil War by successfully blocking economic 
reforms that might have undermined their power, and by using their local political 
supremacy to disenfranchise blacks and re-exert control over the labour force.  In 
Latin America, likewise, dysfunctional oligarchies have been remarkably effective 
at crafting their own re-creation after political shocks: so far, no matter what, 
they have been able to reengineer something resembling a “Southern-style” 
political settlement and distributional outcome.   
The focal point of my analysis will be on how the Chilean élite has 
successfully transformed its “Southern-style” scenario into something 
approaching a ‘stationary process’ ―in the sense that the unbalancing impact of 
shocks (such as the 1982 economic collapse, or the return to democracy in 1990) 
have had only limited life-spans.  Although Latin America’s history is rife with 
shocks, its oligarchies have been able to landscape the new scenarios in such a 
way that they have been able to continue achieving their fairly immutable rent-
seeking goals. 
In the case of Chile, for example, they have done so mainly through three 
channels: one is by forcing straitjackets on new scenarios so as to restrict the 
scope of change ―like when they imposed a draconian Constitution, Buchanan-
style, and a series of leyes de amarre (or “handcuff laws”) on Chile’s young 
democracy, which included retaining Pinochet as head of the Armed Forces for 
another eight years, and then as a senator for life!  The latter category was a 
group of pro-Pinochet appointees large enough so as to ensure the control of the 
Senate by right-wing parties no matter what happened at the elections.  Another 
is by having the agility to reengineer their distributional strategies while 
maintaining their collective action so as to suit the new scenarios.  And finally, by 
cleverly absorbing elements of opposing ideologies (such as now accepting the 
need for ‘social protection’), so as to keep their ideology hegemonic in the new 
scenario ―according to Gramsci, any ideology with that aim must be able to do 
this.  Their trump cards are ruthlessness in the first channel, and the capacity for 
solving any internal problem of ‘collective action’ and fancy footwork (or what 
Brazilians call “jogo de cintura e jeitinho”) in the other two.2 
In distributional terms, the Latin American capitalist élite has (so far) 
managed successfully to stay always on top of the distributional conflict by 
following a complex distributional strategy which could be associated to what in 
game theory is known as a “Parrondo’s paradox” ―or ‘a sequence of losing 
strategies that wins’.3  In its traditional formulation, this paradox consists of two 
games that are played in an alternating sequence.  An analysis of each game in 
isolation shows them to be losing games if played indefinitely (i.e., they have a 
                                   
2  Or, as they say in golf, ‘It's all in the hips’!  
3  See Parrondo (1996).   
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negative expectation).  However, when they are played in an alternating 
sequence, the resulting compound game is, paradoxically, a winning game.  In 
other words, it is possible ―as in Chile― to construct a winning strategy by 
playing apparently losing distributional games alternately. 
It remains to be seen whether the Chilean oligarchy will succeed in doing 
this all over again vis-à-vis the impact of the massive political shocks of the social 
unrest of October 2019 and the pandemic.  That is, whether they can successfully 
reengineer their distributional strategy for the fourth time since crashing the 
Popular Unity government in 1973 ―this time, by trying to rebuild their 
Southern-style rule with their newfound European ‘new’ social democratic-style 
discourse. 
Each of the previous three distributional strategies had a shelf-life, after 
which they had become counterproductive.  Had the oligarchy continued to 
implement them, they would have become losing strategies.  The secret of the 
oligarchy’s long-term distributional success has been making the switch on time.   
If they succeed in doing this again, it will show that their Southern-style 
rule still remains a ‘stationary’ process ―in terms of its capacity to absorb major  
shocks without altering its fundamental structure (i.e. by making their impact 
temporary).  If not, it would mean that, in particular, the October 2019 social 
uprising was a shock too far for the oligarchy, one that finally had a more 
permanent effect on the rentier structure of oligarchy’s Southern-style rule.  
Namely, one that was able to reshape the Chilean political settlement and 
distributional outcome into something resembling a unit-root-style process, where 
the impact of shocks does not decay over time.  
As my understanding of inequality steams from the Ricardian tradition of 
analysing inequality as the outcome of conflict ―in which history, politics and 
institutions is what really matters― my analysis places the emphasis on Gramsci 
rather than Kuznets, on Hirschman rather than Solow, on Mazzucato, Amsden or 
Pérez rather than on neo-classical understandings of the relationship between 
technology and inequality.  The focus is on self-construction rather than on 
fundamental forces of the universe.  The key questions relate to issues such as 
what is it that helps in the formation of collective beliefs?  How do spontaneous 
consensus types of hegemony emerge?  How can they be changed?  The accent is 
on ideology rather than technology; on agency rather than structure (provided 
that agencies are able to understand structure); on choice rather than (Piketty’s) 
historical ‘accidents’;4 and on political articulation rather than economic 
determinism.  It is about fighting artificially created “distributional failures” in the 
sphere of production with Keynesian determination rather than surrendering 
market inequality to the likes of armchair rentiers, speculators (with more 
liquidity than imagination or morals), polluters, natural resource plunders and 
traders.  
All these complexities make the analysis of inequality particularly difficult 
due to its intricacies and overdetermination ―making our modest understanding 
                                   
4  In Piketty’s original (and highly influential) work, there is no room for a ‘natural’ 
tendency for inequality to decline even when a country reaches economic maturity.  In his 
neo-classical (and therefore necessarily mechanistic) model, increasing inequality is 
supposed to be intrinsic to a capitalist economy irrespective of its political settlement and 
level of development. (Piketty, 2014).  For him, it took ‘accidents’ such as two world wars 
and a massive depression to disrupt this supposed pattern (for a discussion of this, see 
Palma, 2019a, Appendix 2).  However, in his next (and outstanding) contribution (Piketty, 
2020) he finally downplays the role of ‘accidents’ by switching his emphasis to ideology.   
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of its dynamics (despite recent progress) one of the most important analytical 
failings of current economic analysis.5  
In fact, Krugman (2011) identified increasing inequality and Latin 
America’s perennial economic underperformance as the two greatest analytical 
challenges in economics today.  However, from my perspective the real challenge 
is to understand the interaction between the two in both mature and emerging 
economies ―as high-income OECD countries are now almost infatuated Latin-
style relentless inequality and perennial underperformance.   
Basically, the high-income OECD now seems determined to mimic the 
(Ricardian-style) Latin American distributional process in which rentiers 
appropriate an ever increasing share of the national income, while capitalists get 
less and less via operating profits ―forcing them to increasingly act as rentiers in 
their productive activities.6  This includes the key role now played by 
financialisation and intellectual property rights in non-financial corporations.7  
The nature of the economic activates may have changed since Ricardo, but 
economic underperformance arising from shifts in distribution from operating 
profits to rents has not.  It’s Ricardo’s growth model all over again!  In fact, 
Ricardo (1817), himself a stockbroker who made most of his fortune as a result of 
speculation on the outcome of the Battle of Waterloo, argued that under certain 
conditions the above mentioned dynamic tends to dominate.  One in which in the 
‘steady state' real wages end up being constant, capitalists make no profits and 
rents reach its maximum possible level.  Only technological progress and 
international trade can come to the rescue and help reverse the slowdown in 
productivity growth resulting from this shift in distribution from profits to rents.  
The specificity of Latin America’s political settlements and distributional 
outcomes is not just about artificially constructed inequalities having come at the 
cost of economic performance, but how the region’s dysfunctional oligarchies 
have shown a remarkable ‘ability to persist’ despite of the above, and in spite of 
economic shocks (such as the 1982 collapse, when Chile’s GDP fell by no less 
than 20%, unemployment jumped to 30%, and half of the population dropped 
below the poverty line), and of political shocks (such as the return to democracy).   
What has happened so far with the pandemic is yet another example of 
this phenomenon: while this plague devastates economic activity and living 
standards ―undoing much of what had taken years to achieve in terms of 
reducing poverty and in some cases a bit of inequality―, most large fortunes 
have continued with their “perpetual mania”.8  
Latin America’s fundamental political economy problem is that there are 
not many ways to reshape the structure of a ‘system’ with so little entropy: there 
are few ways one can redesign the structure of our society and economy ―so it 
can move ‘forward’ in time―, if one can’t change the fundamentals of its status 
                                   
5  For some of the recent contributions, see Atkinson (2015); Bourguignon (2015); 
Galbraith (2016); Milanovic (2016, 2018, and 2019); Ocampo (2019); Palma (2011, 2016 
and 2019a); Piketty (2014 and 2020); Scheidel (2017); and Taylor (2020).   
6  Palma (2019b).  
7  By ‘financialisation’, I understand the rise in size and dominance of the financial sector 
relative to the non-financial sector, as well as the diversification towards financial activities 
in non-financial corporations.  Regarding intellectual property rights as currently 
implemented, they are counterproductive as they may well slow down (rather than the 
speed up) the pace of innovation.  As knowledge is a (global) public good, with no 
marginal costs associated with its use, restricting its access would necessarily cause 
market inefficiency.  Furthermore, as knowledge is the main input for the creation of 
further knowledge, restricting its use inevitably leads to an oligopolistic market for 
knowledge.  The need to provide incentives to innovate is one thing; artificially restricting 
access to knowledge is quite another (see Stiglitz, 2007; and Palma, 2019a).  
8  Palma (2020a).   
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quo: that those at the top can continue to appropriate such an absurd share of 
national income, while doing the ‘low hanging fruit’-type of activities they favour.  
In Darwinian language, as evolution inevitably creates uncertainties to dominant 
agents, the main problem with such a ‘system’ is that the oligarchy expends so 
much energy in trying to ‘stop time’ that there is little left for moving the system 
forward.   
There are many underlying questions: does Latin America’s huge 
inequality reflect a variety of ‘fundamentals’ or specific interactions between 
power structures and choice?  Is high market inequality the product of somehow 
‘exogenous’ factors (as in ‘r>g’ of Piketty’s early neo-classical models) or of 
complex interactions between political settlements and market failures (as 
studied in Palma, 2019a)?  How do we get through the veils obscuring these 
interactions and distorting our vision of the often self-constructed nature of 
inequality?  Has neo-liberal globalisation-cum-financialisation broadened the 
scope for “distributional failures”? 
One key analytical hypothesis proposed here is that Latin America’s 
experience shows that rather than thinking, as in neo-classical terms, of the 
possible concrete effects that well-known factors may have on inequality (e.g., 
technology or education), it would be more illuminating to try to understand the 
concrete expressions that these factors may find in inequality.  Some of the 
pieces of the distributional puzzle may well be the same in different experiences 
of inequality, but the way they fit together may well differ ―sometimes 
significantly.  
In the case of education, for example, there is little doubt that it can have 
a significant distributional impact.  However, the particularly low income-share of 
Chile’s upper-middle (deciles 7 to 9, 35% of national income) is identical to those 
of Malawi, Central African Republic, and Burkina Faso even though in Chile gross 
tertiary enrolment rate reaches almost 90% while in the other countries it does 
not even get to double digits.  In fact, Burundi, DR Congo, Niger, Madagascar, 
Mauritania, Angola and Cote d'Ivoire, also with an enrolment-rate in single digits, 
have an income-share for this group which is actually higher than Chile’s.  The 
issue, of course, is not whether education impacts the value of marginal 
productivities (it certainly does), it is about its quality and who appropriates 
that additional output!  With the topic of the growing inability of labour to get the 
value of its marginal social contributions (due to a lack of property rights over its 
energy and skills), being of paramount importance.9 
In other words, the specificity of Latin America’s inequality stems from 
the particular ways in which distributional struggles between rentiers, capitalists, 
bureaucrats and workers have manifested themselves there, the different 
strategies that oligarchies have adopted to face and temporarily overcome these 
struggles (the main subject matter of this paper), how the capitalist class has 
increasingly joined the ranks of the rentier class (the main subject of Palma, 
2019b), and how further distributional challenges have been created by this 
process, and so on. 
Oddly enough, some still continue to blame Latin America’s inequality on 
colonial institutions from half a millennium ago such as mita (mandatory public 
service by the indigenous population) and the encomienda system that rewarded 
conquerors with the labour of conquered people.10  Others, as in many neo-
classical narratives ―somehow resembling nineteenth century Newtonian physics 
(i.e., methodologies of mechanical determinism and simple causalities)― look at 
the subject with tunnel vision, overstating single issues (such as education or 
                                   
9  This also distorts incentives to acquire skills: what would be the point of making the 
effort if the additional output is bound to be appropriated by others?  (See Pagano, 1997).  
10  For Williamson (2009) —quite rightly— the supposed monotonous persistence of Latin 
America’s inequality is just a myth. 
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skill-biased technological change).11  While others go as far as blaming the ‘lack 
of major wars’, or any such historical ‘accidents’.12 
Indeed, many people’s monotonous insistence on blaming Latin America’s 
huge inequality on traditional ‘exogenous’ or crude path-dependency factors is 
akin to using a pair of scissors to cut an analytical knot they are unable to untie. 
In turn, it is unfortunate that Piketty, in his first and more influential book 
(2014), by unnecessarily relying on the neoclassical theory of factor shares, led 
the debate over increased inequality in most OECD countries since Reagan and 
Thatcher, and the fall of that wall, in the wrong analytical direction —like the 
head of a hunt leading the pack down the wrong path.  Basically, in his 
neoclassical theory, if one has too much of a good thing ―in fact, in his analysis 
two good things: too much investment and too high an elasticity of substitution 
(production flexibilities)―, one unfortunately ends up having higher inequality.  It 
would be hard to put a better spin on increasing inequality than this neo-classical 
one.13 
Instead, as Stiglitz (2012) and I have argued (Palma 2011, 2016 and 
2019a), inequality is a choice; and as I insist in my work, nothing reveals more 
transparently who we truly are than the inequality we collectively choose to 
construct.  As Sartre has argued, we are our choices.14  The bottom line, as the 
title of my 2016 paper indicates, is that every country deserves the 
inequality it has.  It is just not credible to continue claiming that we are 
innocent bystanders of supposedly exogenous fundamentals.15  
In other words, one must always reject mechanical determinisms and 
simple causalities and insist on our ultimate freedom and responsibility.  “I am 
my freedom”, says a character in one of Sartre’s plays.  Every act is a self-
defining one, and no act can really be blamed on so called ‘external’ factors.  The 
classic quotation on this matter comes from Shakespeare, a speech in King Lear:  
This is the excellent foppery of the world, that, when we are sick in fortune, 
―often the surfeit of our own behaviour―, we make guilty of our disasters the sun, 
the moon, and the stars: as if we were villains by necessity; fools by heavenly 
compulsion; knaves, thieves, and treachers, by spherical predominance; drunkards, 
liars, and adulterers, by an enforced obedience of planetary influence; and all that 
                                   
11  Most neoclassical analyses of Latin America’s inequality crucially fail to explain why it is 
much higher than in many middle-income countries elsewhere, for example, in Asia, North 
Africa, the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (among others), even though some of 
the issues they highlight apparently point in the opposite direction. For example, the latter 
often have even more market failures and rigidities than Latin America; they have prices, 
institutions and social capital that are even less ‘right’; they have property rights over 
physical and intellectual assets that are less well-defined and less well-enforced; they have 
educational systems that are even more segmented, with the poor often getting an even 
more dismal deal; they discriminate on gender and race even more than in Latin America; 
they have even greater shortages of skilled labour; their democracies are even more ‘low 
intensity’, and with more problems of ‘governance’; they have an even greater 
dependence on political connections and corruption to achieve success in business. But, 
despite all of this, these countries are less unequal than Latin America (sometimes 
significantly so).   
12  Scheidel (2018); and Piketty (2014).   
13  For a critique of Piketty’s neo-classical analysis, see Rowthorn, (2014); Taylor (2014 
and 2019); Harcourt (2015); and Palma (2019a, especially Appendix 2).   
14  Sartre (2004).   
15  Kaldor (1956), in his analysis of the instability issue of the Harrod–Domar model, was 
the first to break the neo-classical mechanistic spell on the determinants of inequality 
―prompting Solow’s wrath, as he argued that it was impossible to think of an efficient 
distribution of income that was not automatically determined by the value of marginal 
productivities (Solow, 1956). 
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we are evil in, by a divine thrusting on: an admirable evasion of whoremaster man, 
to lay his goatish disposition to the charge of a star!.16 
 
At least it does seem finally to be becoming “common sense” (in Gramsci’s 
perspective) that the ever-increasing market inequality that has characterized the 
global landscape since Reagan and Thatcher has been an artificially 
constructed distributional failure.  Warren Buffett famously explains this 
clearly and succinctly: “There’s class warfare, all right, but it’s my class, the rich 
class, that’s making war, and we’re winning”.  Fundamentals?  What 
fundamentals?  
Basically, if Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ existed, and was what guided 
behaviour, this relentless increase in inequality (particularly in market inequality; 
i.e.  before taxes and transferences; see Appendix 2) could not have taken place, 
as market ‘compulsions’ would have put a stop to it —and to its artificially ‘tailor-
made’ foundations.  In fact, it feels almost ridiculous even having to state that 
ever-increasing market inequality has been an artificially constructed 
distributional failure; it’s like somebody at the circus pointing out that when the 
magician saws a woman in half, it’s only a trick! 
 
1.- Some background issues 
1.1.- ‘Ratchet effects’  
One of the issues I shall analyse in this paper (mostly ignored so far in the 
literature), which has proved to be an important distributional stylised fact in 
post-war Latin America, is the “distributional-ratchet” effect resulting from the 
fact that improvements in inequality have tended to be short-lived, while 
deteriorations have more permanent effects.  That is, the well-known difficulties 
in human history for the reversal of social dynamics seem to apply 
asymmetrically to inequality: increases are hard to reverse while improvements 
are particularly fragile.  What happened in Chile during Allende’s short presidency 
(and its decline in inequality) vs. with Pinochet’s massive deterioration clearly 


















                                   
16  Edmund, Act 1, Scene 2 (132): www.online-literature.com/shakespeare/kinglear/3/ 
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FIGURE 1 
Chile: share of pre-tax income of the top 1%, and the upwards “ratchet 
effect” left by the dictatorship as its distributional legacy, 1964–15 
 
● 1=election of Allende; 2=Pinochet’s coup d'état; 3=the year Pinochet had to call a 
plebiscite seeking a mandate to remain in power for another eight years, and first 
democratic government (centre-left coalition, the ‘Concertación’) after Pinochet lost his 
plebiscite; 4, 5 and 6=next three centre-left governments; 7=election of a centre-right 
government; and 8=the centre-left returns to government.  Averages are harmonic means 
(1957-73, and 1990-2015).17  3-year moving averages.   
● Source: WID (2020), based on Atria et al. (2018).18 
 
What is most striking is that this ratchet at the top occurred despite the fact that 
Pinochet and its allies lost his plebiscite badly, and that in the post-return-to-
democracy period, there were four consecutive ‘centre-left’ governments, and all 
with a political coalition that even included President Allende’s Socialist Party.   
Standing out among other regional distributional ratchets is the case of 
Brazil.  The Brazilian oligarchy was not only able to sustain the increase in 
inequality brought about by the 1964 coup de état, but it also managed to carry 
on enjoying these gains long after the return to democracy ―in fact, until the 
election of President Lula da Silva (see Figure 2).19  This remarkable persistence 
of high inequality (subject only to minor improvements at best) also applies to 
other countries of the region. 
                                   
17  For the non-specialist, the harmonic mean is one of the three Pythagorean means.  It is 
more appropriate for the average of ratios as it mitigates the impact of outliers; it also 
contains more information than the median.  It is the reciprocal of the arithmetic mean of 
the reciprocals. 
18  Broken lines refer to years for which there are no data.  As in the source, ‘fiscal income’ 
from 1964 to 1981, and ‘pre-tax national income’ from 1990 onwards.   
19  On the rapid deterioration of inequality in Brazil alter the 1964 coup, see Fishlow (1972).   
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FIGURE 2  
Colombia, Costa Rica Brazil and Mexico: market and disposable-
income Gini, 1960–2017 
 
● a=election of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva; and b=parliamentary coup d'état against Dilma 
Rousseff; c=election of Miguel de la Madrid; d=election of Óscar Arias; and e=re-election 
of Álvaro Uribe.  Percentages shown in the panels indicate the relative reduction of the 
market-Gini (via taxes and transferences). 
● Source: WIID (2020); and Palma (2019a). 
 
Moreover, as the figure indicates, countries of the region barely reach double 
figures when it comes to improving their ‘market’ inequality via taxes and 
transferences.  These efforts are minimal compared to those of European 
countries (all the way up to 50%; see Appendix 2) ―and even to that of Trump’s 
US (25%)!  How did Latin America manage to achieve so little despite so much 
‘progressive’ talk? 
And Brazil’s 14% reduction in its market-Gini, like South Africa’s similar 
figure, is a particularly modest effort, since fiscal revenues (as a share of GDP) in 
both countries are relatively similar to the OECD.20  The difference between them, 
of course, is that South Africa, despite relatively progressive taxation, fails to 
achieve more due to an ineffective system of transfers to the poor.  Brazil, by 
                                   
20  Di John (2006); Lieberman (2003); and OECD (2020a).   
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contrast, although it has (or should I now say it had?) a more effective 
programme of transfers, falls down badly on its highly regressive tax structure. 
Indeed, another source (WID, 2020), even calls into question Brazil’s 
relative improvement in inequality (as shown in household surveys) during the 
four successive governments of the PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores, or The 
‘Workers' Party’).  It seems that the Brazilian inequalising ‘ratchet’ has really 
continued unyielding until today! (Figure 3.)  
FIGURE 3 
Brazil: pre-tax shares of income of the top 1% and top 10%, and 
post-tax and transference Palma ratio, 2001-2019 
 
● a=election of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva; and b=parliamentary coup against 
President Dilma Rousseff. 
● Source: WID (2020) for income-shares of the top 1% and 10% based on De la Rosa 
(2020); and World Bank (2020) for the Palma ratio.  
 
There’s little indication here that the supposed minor decline of the income share 
of those at the top during the PT era did actually take place (other than on paper).  
As ex-President Cardoso famously said, “Lula knows how to please the élite”.21  
Even successful policies during the PT period, such as for poverty reduction, for 
the formalisation of labour contracts, and for the increase of the minimum wage 
(as well as for slowing-down the destruction of the Amazon) are now at risk not 
just because of the economic impact of the pandemic, but also due to its current 
“peripheral-fascist” ideology, its negationist politics on pandemics, its petty 




Amazonian-nationalism, and early Washington Consensus/Chicago-style neo-
liberalism in economic policies.22 
 The same scepticism is called for Chile’s much-heralded minor 
improvements on inequality (see Figure 1 above and 9 below).  For those 
‘progressives’ in Latin America wanting to change the “Southern-style” 
distributional equilibrium, it has proved much easier to ‘talk the talk’ than ‘walk 
the walk’!   
 
1.2.- How dysfunctional institutions are rather effective at 
their own re-creation when shocked out of balance  
As suggested above, all this brings us back to the complex issue of ‘persistence 
and change in institutions’, and in particular how dysfunctional institutions are so 
effective at recreating themselves ―as the landed élite did in the South after 
losing the Civil War.  Likewise, the Chilean oligarchy was able to do the same, 
despite losing badly the 1988 plebiscite and then four presidential and 
parliamentary elections thereafter.  As times have changed, rather than lynching 
their object of hate, it’s now more effective to co-opt them.  However, as times 
have not changed that much, the oligarchy managed to impose on the majority a 
straitjacket Constitution, littered with institutions above democratic control.  In 
turn, thanks to supramajorities being required in Parliament, and to the 
‘appointed’ life Senators, those institutions above democratic control made 
changing the Constitution practically impossible.  It took a social explosion of the 
magnitude of that of October 2019 to shock Chile’s “Southern equilibrium” out of 
balance enough to force business leaders to convince the powers that be to start 
constitutional change. When the referendum on this possibility took place exactly 
a year after the social unrest (and 30 years after the return to democracy), it 
attracted an 80% positive response (on a high turnout)! 
As to the role played by the ‘new’ left in helping sustain Chile’s “Southern 
equilibrium” (see Appendix 1), according to Gramsci, any ideology that wants to 
remain hegemonic must be able to absorb elements of opposing ideologies; but it 
must do so in an imaginative way, articulating them with the essence of its own 
ideology.  That is, for a consensus to remain hegemonic, dominant groups have 
to make ideological concessions to subordinate groups, but without endangering 
their domination.  This was what the centre-left parties did so badly after the 
1988 Plebiscite, while the right-wing forces did so well after their bad defeat, 
helping the business élite to retain de facto political power.  The centre-left 
parties, meanwhile, inspired by the “Third Way” of the Western European ‘new’ 
social democracy, made that Gramscian ideological integrative effort in a lazy, 
often opportunistic way, letting the new neo-liberal economic ideology simply 
replace its previous (‘post-war-type’) social democratic ideology. 
Here the similarities to what happened in South Africa (Africa’s honorary 
Latin American country) after the beginning of democracy in 1994, is also more 
than superficial: the battle lost by the Afrikaner political élite may been as big as 
they come, but the white capitalist élite (helped by the co-option of a critical 
mass of the ANC élite) is still appropriating the highest share of income in the 
world today!23 
                                   
22  In terms of the current pandemics, if we continue to destroy habitats and ruin 
ecosystems, other viruses will be waiting to jump from animals to humans; it’s likely that 
the continued destruction of the Amazon is the next health crisis awaiting its big break.  At 
the moment of writing, even areas outside the Amazon, such as Pantanal, are now being 
burnt to the ground ―more than a quarter of it has already been destroyed.  As Einstein 
once said, “Two things are infinite: the universe and human stupidity” (adding, “although 
I’m not sure about the universe”).  
23  Palma (2011, Appendix 3). 
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From this perspective, as Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) point out, one 
should never lose sight of the distinction between the two components of political 
power, the de jure (institutional) and de facto political power.  Latin America’s 
political misfortune is that the oligarchy’s de facto political power is such that 
dysfunctional institutions have been able to survive democratic ‘shocks’ relatively 
unscathed.  The Latin American ‘new’ left has proved to be just one casualty in 
that history (see Appendix 1). 
 
1.3.- Inequality as an anti-coordination ‘chicken game’  
In game theory, a ‘chicken game’ is a model of conflict associated with a diverse 
range of social conflicts.  It’s a question of which player yields first, as in the 
1955 film Rebel Without a Cause; stolen cars are raced towards an abyss, and 
whoever jumps out first will be deemed a ‘chicken’.  Bertrand Russell (1959) also 
famously used it as a metaphor for the psychotically dangerous game of nuclear 
brinkmanship. 
This is an ‘anti-coordination’ game because the shared resource is 
rivalrous (although non-excludable).  Namely, sharing comes at a cost; i.e., it is 
subject to a negative externality.  This, of course, does not have to be the case in 
distributional games if the players are involved in a Marshallian ‘efficiency wage’ 
scenario because of the positive feedback between wages and productivity growth.  
However, try explaining that to a neo-liberal oligarchy whose income depends on 
their not understanding.   
The unstable state of affairs that characterises a game of chicken 
(sometimes also called a ‘hawk/dove’ game) leads to a situation in which there 
are only two possible (and opposite) Nash equilibria ―corresponding to each 
player’s preferred strategy.24  Anything in between is an unstable mixed outcome, 
always subject to being challenged.  So one effective tactic (particularly relevant 
for this story) would be for one party to signal his or her intentions convincingly 
enough —in other words, it could easily become a game of ‘brinkmanship': a 
strategic move designed to avert the possibility of the opponent switching to 
aggressive behaviour.  This is one reason why an ‘irrational’ player tends to 
have the upper hand.  And since credible threats —no matter how irrational— 
can be very effective, the set of institutions and rules within which a distributional 
struggle is played out becomes crucial as it helps promote the credibility of one or 
another party.   
In fact, one way of understanding the post-1980 neo-liberal 
transformations is in terms of the creation of an artificially constructed 
institutional scenario where the brinkmanship of the top —irrational though it may 
be— should be taken extremely seriously by workers and the state.  It now 
seems clear that these reforms had little to do (in both mature and emerging 
economies) with increased efficiency, and a lot to do with helping capital to regain 
its legitimacy and recover the upper hand ―a legitimacy it had lost in the depths 
of the 1930s to Roosevelt’s determination in implementing the institutional 
transformation of the New Deal, the horror of war, the increasing organisation of 
the working class, and the genius of Keynes.  Even in the US, the income of the 
                                   
24  In this game, the strategic space for both players would be ‘demand redistribution’ and 
‘not demand redistribution’ for the majority player, and ‘yield to redistribution’ and ‘not 
yield to redistribution’ for the capitalist élite.  This is a multiple equilibria a story.  In turn, 
the Nash equilibria would be ‘demand redistribution’, ‘yield to redistribution’, and ‘do not 
demand redistribution’, ‘do not yield to redistribution’ for the majority player and élite 
player, respectively.  In the first, the majority player has the upper hand, while in the 
second it is the élite one.  
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bottom 40% grew faster than that of the richest 1% during the three decades 
from the end of the war until Reagan.25  
One of the aims of the 1980s reforms was to reverse this.  From Walter 
Benjamin’s perspective (1966), all class society is in a permanent state of 
emergency because rulers are always under threat;26 so neo-liberalism aimed at 
building a consensus and a praxis ―and a “common sense”― that would help to 
create a class society in which rulers escape this threat by their ability to 
debilitate the rest of society enough by imposing on them a continuously 
insecure life.  In this scenario, a mobile and malleable agent might achieve an 
unrivalled dominance.  In the jungle, big capital (especially a rentier financial 
one) is king!  And in this context, any progressive nationalist development 
agenda runs the risk of becoming a collective suicide pact. 
This brings to mind Foucault’s (2004) proposition that neo-liberalism is not 
really a set of economic policies but a new, more effective technology of power.27  
So workers are now back to old-fashioned precarious jobs; safety nets are being 
deliberately made increasingly porous; and easy access to persecutory debt is 
leading to what Krugman (2005) calls “the return to a debt-peonage society”.  
Surely, what Thatcher had in mind was not so much a property-owning 
democracy as a ‘mortgage-owning’ one!  In turn, ‘subsidiary states’ allow little or 
no space for policy options or agencies, other than those that are meant to keep 
capital sweet.  
And the uncertainties of a new technological paradigm have not helped 
either, giving massive opportunities to financial capital and a few particular skills 
and innovators, while bringing further uncertainties to the majority of workers 
and the state.28  
The bottom line for neo-liberalism is how to reconstruct an economic and 
institutional scenario in which everybody knows that capital can pull the plug 
whenever it wants to.  Under these circumstances, the ideological acceptance by 
the majority of the “preferred” strategy of the rich could be considered ‘smart’, 
rather than ‘chicken’, making such an unfavourable position more bearable.  
Shared pain can even feel reassuring.  After all, as Benjamin also reminds us, 
before all philosophy comes the struggle for material existence.   
In developing countries, the challenge for capital to develop more effective 
forms of legitimacy, and more sophisticated technologies of dispossession, has 
been even greater.  In the new complexities of a post-Cold War scenario, just 
having a minor Mussolini or two, such as Pinochet, was no longer enough. 
The neo-liberal discourse may have burst onto the world stage during the 
thirst for new ideas in the 1970s, promoting ‘order’, market efficiency, individual 
initiative, non-paternalism, sound macroeconomics and a new concept of the 
state.  However, what was ultimately on offer for workers and the state was a 
permanent life on the edge and a high-risk and unstable ‘order’ in which only 
mobile capital can really thrive, with the state mostly reduced to a ‘fire-fighting’ 
role. 
In a way, Keynes’ ideas were mostly about fighting these types of 
inefficient and old-fashioned ‘anti-coordination’ games, searching for more 
efficient and stable cooperative outcomes.  The ‘mass production for mass 
consumption’ technological paradigm also helped this type of scenario, especially 
as it was in its ‘mature stage’.29  However, if capital or labour pushed things 
towards brinkmanship scenarios, what was imperative for Keynes was to prevent 
                                   
25  Saez and Zucman (2016); and Palma (2019a).   
26  On ‘states of emergency’, see Arantes (2007). 
27  Frangie (2008); Palma (2014).   
28  Pérez (2002). 
29  Mazzucato (2013 and 2018; Pérez (2002). 
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a player prone to ‘irrational’ behaviour —such as financial capital— from getting 
the upper hand.   
 
2.-  Why the rich remain rich: on the Chilean capitalist élite 
“ability to persist” 
As already suggested, one possible explanation of Chile’s stubbornly stable 
inequalising scenario is that it somehow resembles a ‘Parrondo’s paradox’: it has 
been possible to construct a winning strategy by playing losing games alternately, 
switching between them when the game could become counterproductive (when 
it has passed its ‘sell-by’ date). 
There are many examples of these counter-intuitive reversals; in financial 
markets, for example, one can think of games that would guarantee that a player 
would lose all his money, but could generate a winning streak if played 
alternately.30  
In the case of Chile, this specific political scenario is rather transparent —
although the oligarchy’s ‘winning strategy’ has involved more than two games, so 
its mathematical solution would imply a more complex convex scenario than the 
usual linear combination of two games.31 
The basic political dilemma for any oligarchy determined to hold on to 
such degrees of inequality is how to construct a winning strategy that is 
sustainable when in a democracy, given the fact that the oligarchy forms such 
a tiny minority and that the distributional outcome that it seeks is so remarkably 
unequal. 
What is needed to build a long term winning strategy of this type is the 
power to narrow down the range for change (by imposing constitutional and legal 
limits to it), and both the flexibility to switch between strategies as soon as they 
become counterproductive, and the capacity to solve any internal ‘collective 
action’ problem that may emerge along the way in order to ensure cohesion —so 
that members act together (even when individuals may have incentives to free-
ride), a phenomenon that is sometimes associated with the concept of “élite 
closure”.32  In fact, the role of the élite’s capacity for collective action in helping 
them to get the upper hand is a subject which was already highlighted in Adam 
Smith’s masterpiece; discussing the institutional and political scenario in which 
wages are settled, he says:  
It is not, however, difficult to foresee which of the two parties [capitalist or 
workers] must, upon all ordinary occasions, have the advantage in the dispute, 
and force the other into a compliance with their terms. The masters, … can 
combine much more easily; and the law, besides, [is on their side] ... . (Smith 
1776, Book 1, Chapter 5) 
 
These are crucial components for the oligarchy’s ability to persist.  From this 
perspective, Douglas North was surely right when he developed his ‘limited 
access order’ hypothesis: how political elites able to maintain cohesion can divide 
up the control of rents and block the access of others.33  
 
                                   
30  See, for example, http://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/25/science/paradox-in-game-
theory-losing-strategy-that-wins.html 
31  For an example of a 3–periodic game, see Key, et al, 2002.   
32  In the recent plebiscite to change the Pinochet’s Constitution, which got 80% national 
support, only in the three upper class districts of Santiago there was a majority against.  
33  North et al.  (2007). 
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3.-  ‘Strategy 1’: how to convert the probabilistic outcome of 
a distributional chicken-game into a deterministic ‘winner-
takes-all’ scenario using terror  
When Chile elected a left-wing government in 1970 —and that government 
(unusually enough) was prepared to implement the radical distributional 
programme for which it had been democratically elected (see Figure 1 above, and 
5 and 6 below)— the Chilean oligarchy switched to the nuclear option of a coup 
de état (in a country with a long democratic tradition).   
In game theory language, the oligarchy succeeded in switching the 
traditional ‘game of chicken’ distributional scenario from one in which the poor 
were getting the upper, to one in which it could implement its own “preferred” 
distributional strategy unimpeded ―i.e., a ‘winner takes all’ scenario.  The key 
component of this new “Nash equilibrium”, with its particularly asymmetric set of 
distributive strategic choices, and the corresponding payoffs, was that the all-too-
powerful top income player could now easily convince the majority that there was 
no point in trying to challenge this scenario while it had the whole apparatus of 
state terror at its disposal. 
The distributional outcome of this new ‘insatiable appetite’ distributional 
strategy —the oligarchy’s ‘strategy 1’ in this narrative— is evident in Figure 4. 
FIGURE 4 
Chile: changes in income shares between 1973 and 1987 
 
● Source: calculations done by Pamela Jervis and the author using the FACEA (2019) 
database.34  Data refer to household per capita (pc) income in ‘Greater Santiago’ (where 
                                   
34  In Chile, there are two household surveys.  One is this, and the other is a national one 
(CASEN), which started in 1987, and is carried out every two or three years (see 
http://www.mideplan.cl/casen).  The data in WB (2020) and SEDLAC (2020) correspond to 
the latter survey.   
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about 40% of the population lives).  It excludes from family incomes those of lodgers and 
domestic servants living in the house, those declared as ‘zero’, ‘does not know’, and ‘does 
not answer’. 
 
In fact, the share of D10 increased from 34% of national income to no less than 
52% during this fourteen-year period (1973-1987) ―for which even the share of 
D9 had to be squeezed!  This scenario resembles a reverse Robin Hood who not 
only robs the poor to give to the rich, but also robs the rich to give to the very 
rich! 
 
4.- ‘Strategy 2’. The new challenge for the élite: how to 
reconstruct a more sophisticated form of legitimacy via a 
more refined technology of power. 
No matter how vicious the dictatorship might be, the oligarchy would not be able 
to play its ‘strategy 1’ indefinitely.  Inevitably, towards the end of the 1980s, the 
distributional game began to move away from its (terror-based) Nash 
‘equilibrium’ as new generations began to lose their fear of challenging the 
political settlement and distributional outcome associated with the oligarchy’s 
‘preferred’ strategy. 
The only way out of this conundrum was for Pinochet to try to legitimise 
his rule by calling a plebiscite in 1988 that would allow him to remain as Head of 
State for another 8 years ―one that he lost badly, even though the previous year 
he had tried to reverse some of the worse aspects of his distributional policy (see 
movement from 3 to 4 in Figure 7 below). 
In fact, as he tried to improve his ‘democratic credentials’, he shot himself 
in the foot badly: just weeks before the plebiscite, he signed the UN Convention 
on Human Rights, an action he would live to regret as it was his ratification of this 
convention that allowed Juez Garzón from Spain to ask the British government for 
his extradition in 1998.  This was the first time that a former head of government 
was arrested on the principle of ‘universal jurisdiction’.  Also, and again for the 
first time, this led to the principle of the immunity of Head of States (or former 
ones) not applying to crimes against humanity being enshrined in international 
law. 
As Pinochet lost his plebiscite, and his supporters also lost the subsequent 
presidential and parliamentary elections badly, the élite had little choice but to 
switch its distributional strategy (to ‘strategy 2’).  This they did rather effectively. 
Essentially, this ‘strategy 2’ resembled the ancient Roman Catholic 
practice of buying ‘indulgences’, by which sinners (in this case the oligarchy 
misbehaving during the dictatorship) could pay for certificates that recognised 
that their penance had washed them free of sin.   
Suddenly, those at the top became ‘born-again democrats’, even 
supporting some progressive distributional policies of the new centre-left 
democratic government.  They even turned out to be in favour of more 
progressive tax reform, although (with the help of ‘life Senators’ appointed by 
Pinochet) they succeeded in imposing the condition that this would be only a 
temporary measure.  They also supported an increase in the minimum wage and 
other policies for poverty reduction, a mild reform of labour legislation, and so on. 
A crucial component of ‘strategy 2’ was the need for the oligarchy to 
rebuild its traditional distributional alliance with the middle and upper-middle 
since, as Figures 4 above and 5 below indicate, they too had been squeezed 
during the top’s ‘winner-takes-all’ distributional strategy.  Therefore, it also 
supported (and pressured) the centre-left government towards different 
measures to benefit this sector.  So, the share of deciles 5 to 9 recovered some 
of the ground it had lost during the dictatorship, but then stabilised at a level 
 17 
below 50% of the national income ―well below what it had enjoyed before 1973, 
indicating a downward ratchet for the middle and upper-middle.  (Figure 5.) 
FIGURE 5 
Chile: share of income of the middle and upper-middle (D5-D9), 
1957-2014 
 
● 1=election of President Allende; 2=Pinochet’s coup d’état; 3=election in 1989 of the first 
of four consecutive centre-left governments after Pinochet lost his 1988 plebiscite; after 
3=next three centre-left governments and one right-wing one.35 Averages are harmonic 
means (1957-73, and 1990-2014).  3-year moving averages. 
● Source: as in Figure 4.   
 
The key message of this figure is that Chile is one of the very few countries in the 
world where deciles 5 to 9 are unable to defend their half of national income 
(Palma, 2019a).  Also, this picture does not really fit within a ‘public choice’ 
perspective where the process of rational decision making favours logic, 
objectivity, and analysis over subjectivity and intuition, and where the agent 
chooses actions based on their outcomes.  In Chile, instead, the middle and 
upper-middle (deciles 5 to 9) seem to make choices rather independently from 
their outcome…  Perhaps identity, subjectivity and intuition (let’s call it ideology 
for short) play a greater role in life than Buchanan realised.  In fact, the income-
share of this half of the population has never increased so much as during 
President Allende’s short period of office (from 1 to 2 in the figure), even though 
the majority of its opponents (and certainly the most vociferous) came from this 
group; in turn, its income-share has never lost so much ground as during the 
Pinochet dictatorship (from 2 to 3), despite this group being made of some of his 
most ardent supporters. 
                                   
35  In the CASEN survey, the cycles after ‘3’ are far less sharp.   
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In turn, Figure 6 indicates changes in the income-share of the bottom 
40%. 
FIGURE 6 
Chile: share of income of the bottom 40%, 1957-2014 
 
● Periods and averages as Figure 5.  3-year moving averages. 
● Source: as in Figure 4.   
 
As with the income share of the middle and upper-middle strata, that of the 
bottom 40% did recover after the return to democracy; however, and as opposed 
to the downwards ratchet of D5-D9 shown in Figure 5, during the period covered 
by the oligarchy’s ‘strategy 2’ this share did return to its pre-1973 levels ―thanks 
to successful distributional policies targeted at the bottom of the income scale.  In 
fact, it was even in an ascendant trend when the centre-left lost its fourth 
attempt at re-election in 2010.   
All in all, ‘strategy 2’ was a great success for the élite; it may well have 
lost some of its Pinochet-share in national income, but these elements of 
‘strategy 2’ were like a sacrifice in a game of chess, where deliberately losing one 
piece might help to win the game.  However, as the oligarchy obviously had no 
intention of wearing its progressive mask indefinitely, as soon as it had succeeded 
in recovering a minimum of democratic legitimacy (i.e., when it finally obtained 
its certificate as ‘born-again’ democrats), it was ready to move credibly to a new 
(more distributionally aggressive) strategy ―‘strategy 3’. 
Therefore, and despite being a political minority (but greatly helped by the 
ability to leverage the tailor-made political and economic scenario built by 
Pinochet’s Constitution and his “handcuff laws”), it began its switch into a more 
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aggressive strategy by doing things such as defeating further labour and tax 
reforms in parliament (with the help of Pinochet’s ‘appointed’ senators).36 
What is remarkable is that the oligarchy and its military allies managed to 
regain the upper hand to such an extent that it once again began resembling 
their preferred ‘winner-take-all’ scenario ―but now in a democracy.  But how 
were they able to do so?  How did they succeed in helping create a ‘spontaneous-
type hegemonic consensus’ around their ‘unfettered-markets-supremacy-cum-
trickledown’ discourse?  And why was the ‘new’ left by then not just ideologically 
neutralised, but also seduced into cheerleading this transformation?  (If you can’t 
beat them, join them, perhaps?)  
 
5.- From ‘2’ to ‘3’: the switch back towards something 
resembling a ‘Nash equilibrium’ around the élite’s extremely 
unequal set of distributive strategic choices, and 
corresponding unilateral payoffs 
The first key aim of ‘strategy 3’ consisted of trying to stabilise the distributional 
outcome of ‘strategy 2’ ―for the oligarchy enough was enough, as far as 
concessions were concerned!  The second was to entrench their ideology as 
hegemonic.  When both objectives were achieved, which coincided with the early 
stages of the second presidency of the centre-left, the oligarchy could finally 
abandon all pretence and return to distorting resource allocation and inequality in 
its favour (see Figure 1). 
The oligarchy’s remarkable success during this period tends to confirm my 
hypothesis that neo-liberalism may well have become one of the most effective 
technologies of power ever.  In Latin America, the neo-liberal ideology ―with its 
extremely successful process of ‘re-legitimisation’ of capital― became just 
shorthand for “the art of getting away with extremely unequal distributional 
outcomes within democracies”.  Or, in the language of game theory, it became a 
technology of power capable of transforming a particularly asymmetric set of 
distributive strategic choices, and the corresponding unilateral payoffs, into a 
Nash equilibrium by convincing the majority ―and in a democracy (albeit a low-
intensity one)― that it was futile trying to challenge this while the all-too-
powerful top income players keep their strategy unchanged. 
And there was no point in challenging it not just because the chances of 
doing this successfully were minimal (given the artificial nature of the setting in 
which the game was being played ―one that had been tailor-made to help the 
oligarchy getting the upper hand), but also because a substantial majority 
became ideologically convinced that their meagre payoff was just their fate in 
life!  And that this type of neo-liberalism, in any case, under the current 
international and domestic scenarios, was the only workable game in town.  
As a result, the distributional game (slowly but surely) ceased to be one of 
“chicken”, and became one in which it was possible to achieve this most unlikely 
Nash equilibrium around ‘strategy 3’ mostly by ideological conviction ―this is 
what is most remarkable about neo-liberalism as a technology of power as it 
could do this by means other than the old-fashioned forms of social conflict 
                                   
36  And this in a country where fiscal revenues were still just about 20% of GDP (OECD, 
2020a and 2020b); and a country in which the higher the income decile, the lower the 
proportion of income paid in taxes (see Engel et al., 1999; and López and Miller, 2008).  
Also, as in the rest of Latin America, income tax evasion was rampant ―ECLAC calculated 
that in 2016, tax evasion represented 7% of the regional GDP 
(https://www.cepal.org/en/news/tax-evasion-latin-america-totals-340-billion-dollars-and-
represents-67-regional-gdp).   
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resolution.  In other words, it was finally capable of achieving in democracy what 
it had previously only managed to do in a dictatorship. 
This is a real achievement, as in most parts of the world oligarchies could 
only achieve this (i.e., something resembling ‘strategy 3’), if neo-liberals and 
business leaders allied themselves with ancillary causes —culture wars, racism, 
misogyny, nativism, xenophobia, nationalism, and any possible right-wing 
populist cause.  Their support for Trump and Bolsonaro are paradigmatic.  
However, this was not really necessary in Chile (or not anywhere near as much), 
where the key for its élite’s success was its capacity to implement more 
traditional neo-liberal technologies of power, such as its ability to debilitate the 
rest of society by imposing an increasingly insecure life on workers and the State.  
These actions represented the stick, while the carrot was the promise that the 
payoff for the majority would eventually improve thanks to trickle-down effects, 
and that they should be reasonable because there was no better alternative 
―theirs was the only game in town.   
So Chile could move from a banana-republic scenario in which the 
oligarchy needed a minor and corrupt Mussolini to achieve its aims, to a more 
sophisticated one in which military regimes —the traditional hedge against a 
progressive distributional challenge by the majority —could become obsolete.   
Furthermore, it could do so without having to fall into the other types of 
bait-and-switch settings, like those mentioned above.  In short, neo-liberalism at 
its best! 
The fast economic growth during the initial phase of this period (see Figure 
8 below) supports Díaz-Alejandro’s (1983) critical proposition ―perhaps the 
greatest insight of any Latin American economist ever: in terms of policy success, 
what matters is not so much the nature of the actual policies implemented, but 
the degree of support that they manage to gather behind a given set of policies. 
However, the real challenge for the capitalist élite was that in order to 
sustain ‘strategy 3’ ―and maintain that degree of support― it had to deliver high 
levels of economic growth and trickle-down. This was the only way to resist the 
natural tendency of a democracy towards a mixed and unstable distributional 
game that is constantly under challenge.  That is, in order to manufacture 
consent (in Chomsky’s sense), this élite also needed to show that its economic 
model could really deliver progress and wellbeing.37  
However, and inevitably, reality caught up with this ‘cosy’ ‘strategy 3’ 
―cosy for the élite, that is―, as in a capitalist economy with such few 
compulsions, growth was bound to decelerate, and with it most of the trickle-
down.38  Unsurprisingly, with the shift in distribution from profits to rents (typical 
of this type of ‘cosy’ capitalism) investment fell from close to 30% of GDP in the 
early 1990s to just over 20% in the late 2010s;39 meanwhile, productivity growth 
collapsed from 3.9% p.a. between 1986 and 1998 to just 0.4% the decade before 
the explosion of discontent at end of 2019 (see Figure 8 below).   
There is little doubt that in terms of the trickle-down effect and the well-
being of the majority, ‘strategy 3’ failed miserably: in a country that had achieved 
a per capita GDP of US$ 15,000 (US$ 25,000 at purchasing power parity)40, such 
a degree of inequality meant that in the final stages of ‘strategy 3’ the median 
net wage of Chilean workers was not high enough even to bring a family of four 
above the poverty line ―with nearly two-thirds of female workers in this position, 
                                   
37  Herman and Chomsky (1988). 
38  On why markets need to generate ‘compulsions’, such as proper competition, for its 
dynamic, see especially Wood (2002), and Khan (2005).   
39  World Bank (2020).  
40  Ibid.  
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because, as expected in such a scenario, this median hides a huge gender gap 
(on average, women earned 28% less than men).41   
And all this happened in a country that likes to think of itself ad portas of 
becoming a ‘developed’ one ―a good example of wishful thinking becoming 
delusional. 
Bearing this in mind, the most surprising aspect of this most unlikely of 
Nash equilibria achieved in ‘strategy 3’ is that while it was taking place, there was 
an obvious ‘collective action’ challenge for the majority: it could improved its 
payoff if only it could somehow agreed on a strategy different from the current 
one.  But the centre-left political parties, while still commanding the support of 
about half of the population, did not face up even to this challenge.  All they did 
was keep singing the praises of the mode of accumulation ingrained in ‘strategy 
3’, while taking a bit more seriously the task of helping those who had become 
‘surplus to requirements’ in ‘strategy 3’.42  
The idea that ‘there is no alternative’ was really embedded in the 
spontaneous consensus around ‘strategy 3’; in fact, it synthesised the 
fundamental core belief of the “Anglo-Iberian”-style neo-liberal discourse.  And 
this ‘taboo’ had an amazing paralysing effect on the ‘new’ left and on the majority 
of the population. 
In Freudian parlance, the ‘totem’ built around the power of ‘unfettered 
markets’, giving them an almost spiritual significance ―as a symbol that is 
erected as the emblem of the neo-liberal tribe, one that has been converted to a 
kind of animistic pagan religion―, coupled with the taboo against even daring to 
think of alternatives (it is the end of history, after all…) is one of the most brilliant 
of ideological tricks ever. 
Surely Gramsci must have felt revindicated.  In a democracy, distributive 
struggles are basically won or lost at the level of ideology. Fundamentals?  What 
fundamentals?  
Also, as Albert Einstein emphasised (and Althusser, 1975, later 
theorised)43, even in natural sciences “Whether you can observe a thing or not 
depends on the theory which you use.  It is the theory which decides what can be 
observed.”44  And in the social sciences, this theory will also suggest the range of 
options for the econometric specification.  And the circle can easily be closed as in 
traditional econometric testing there is the problem of “too big to fail” ―i.e., in 
very large samples p-values go quickly to zero; this can mislead researchers to 
claim support for results of no practical significance.45   
                                   
41  Durán and Kremerman (2020).  
42  It’s really difficult to understand why élites in high middle-income countries are so 
reluctant to eradicate poverty, as this would be so remarkably cheap.  ECLAC (2010) 
calculates that in six Latin American countries (including Chile), the cost of a ‘one poverty 
line’ monetary transfer to all the unemployed, all people over 64, and all children under 15 
of vulnerable households would be equivalent to between 1.8 and 2.7 per cent of GDP —
not such an insurmountable task!  Even Brazil’s successful ‘Bolsa Familia’ programme costs 
just half a percentage point of GDP (Holmes et al., 2011).   
43  On Althusser see also Laclau (2012).   
44  Quoted in Heisenberg (1971, p. 63). This author adds “… as Einstein has emphasized, … 
deduction in [a scientist’s] method runs not from facts to the assumptions of the theory 
but from the assumed theory to the facts and the … data.  Consequently, theories have to 
be proposed speculatively and pursued deductively with respect to their many 
consequences so that they can be put to … tests. In short, any theory … makes more … 
philosophical assumptions than the facts alone give or imply (Heisenberg, 1958). 
45  In other words, unless the true effect of size is exactly zero, all that is needed ‘to reject’ 
the null hypothesis (even when the null hypothesis of no effect is true), and declare that 
there is a statistically significant effect, is a large enough sample ―particularly when 
working with traditionally unambitious levels of significance.   
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6.- From ‘3’ to ‘4’ 
The strength and weakness of the neo-liberal discourse resemble Callicles’ 
dialogue (he is a character in Plato’s Gorgias):  
It is natural and just for the strong to dominate the weak, and … it is unfair for the 
weak to resist such oppression by establishing laws to limit the power of the 
strong.46 
 
In Callicles’ opinion ―as in the neo-liberal critique of the post-war social 
democratic welfare state―, the problem (and what had to be reversed) had been 
that  
The stronger, more aggressive and domineering by nature, had been defanged and 
domesticated by the new legal institutions of the weak demos.47 
  
And this is Callicles again, here trying to talk Socrates out of philosophising: 
[…] for philosophy, Socrates, if pursued in moderation and at the proper age, is an 
elegant accomplishment, but too much philosophy is the ruin of human life.  […] 
Take my advice, abandon argument.  Learn the philosophy of business, and 
acquire the reputation of wisdom. […]  Cease, then, emulating these paltry 
splitters of words, and emulate only the man of substance and honour, who is well 
to do”.48 
 
In sum, as the capitalist élite liked to preach to the ‘new’ left during ‘strategy 2’, 
‘quit philosophising’, ‘abandon argument’, get real, do an MBA!  It would also help 
if one could convince the rest of society that the ‘dissident’ camp was solely made 
up of pedantic doctrinaires. 
The debilitating component of this discourse is that ‘quitting 
philosophising’ and ‘abandoning argument’ really meant quitting critical 
thinking.49  The problem with critical thinking, of course, is that it is a distancing, 
even debilitating, activity.  It distances us from conventions, from established 
assumptions and from settled beliefs.  It takes what we know from familiar, 
unquestioned settings and makes it strange.  And it does so not by just supplying 
new information, but by inviting and provoking a new way of seeing. 
The risk is that once the familiar becomes strange, it is never quite the 
same again.  However unsettling, the change can never be undone —it can never 
be un-thought or un-known.  And as many in the Latin American left know only 
too well, there are also huge risks involved, both political and personal.  One way 
of avoiding those risks (particularly after so many disappointments, so much 
vulgarity and terror) is through a characteristic evasion: evasion as scepticism.  
Although, as Immanuel Kant (1787) reminds us, a period of scepticism can be a 
welcome resting place to reflect upon dogmatic wanderings, to remain there is 
simply to give up on moral reflection.  
The point here, of course, is that despite delusional fantasies of ‘oligarchic 
supremacy by some deserving moral right’, the stronger are not so by ‘nature’ 
but by environment.  This is the core issue of the Darwinian insight that a 
subset of members of a population may come to flourish relative to other 
members simply because they possess a feature, which others do not, that 
renders them relatively suited to some local environment.  The question of the 
intrinsic worth of those who flourish most is not relevant to the story.50   
                                   
46  See https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1672/1672-h/1672-h.htm 
47  Ibid.   
48  Ibid.   
49  See Palma (2014). 
50  Lawson (2003). 
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This is what leads to a crucial component of my explanation of what neo-
liberalism is really about: it is a conscious and deliberate attempt to create a 
specific (and artificially constructed) economic environment that is most suited to 
those features that capital possesses and others do not ―one in which a mobile 
and malleable agent could achieve an unrivalled dominance, which then creates 
the seductive force of absolute power that feeds this ideology with narcissism; 
one that has spellbound the ‘new’ left.   
One reason for this dominance is that in this scenario, capital has easy 
access to mobile financial assets that provide an expedient ‘exit strategy’.  Hence, 
its threats in the distributional game in that scenario are surely credible.  It is like 
a kid telling the other players in a street football match that either he plays 
centre-forward or he goes home and takes the ball with him.  Surely not the best 
scenario for building an effective team! 
Another metaphor would be like having a puzzle made of (say) 100 pieces, 
but a few large ones have the option to decide what shape they would like to take, 
and then all the rest has to reshape to accommodate.  Or, according to the great 
Argentinean cartoonist Quino, it is like a game of chess in which the oligarchy can 
checkmate its opponents whenever it likes, whatever its position on the board 
―which would make the game rather boring and predictable.  
 However, on the positive side, having an expedient exit strategy is 
precisely what helps the Latin American oligarchies to become more democratic 
―i.e., it is easier to take the risk if one is no longer geographically tied by ‘fixed’ 
investments (such as land in the past).51 
Although the core of their accumulation will always be their home country 
(where else could they hope for the kind of returns they get there in the purely 
extractive side of commodities and some non-tradable and finance?), they can 
now conveniently operate in a geographically wide portfolio.   
In Chile, for example, and according to balance of payment statistics, the 
assets of the ‘international investment position’ of the financial and non-financial 
private sector (not counting private pension funds) reached US$383 billion in 
2018 ─ about a third larger than that year’s GDP.52  And the foreign currency 
component of overall debt by non-financial corporations reached one third of GDP 
(about US$100 billion) ―as a share of GDP, the largest among all emerging 
economies with the exception of China.53  And unlike China, with little to show for 
it in terms of investment, technological absorption, domestic product 
diversification and productivity growth!  In fact, while in Chile the average 
investment per worker increased by about a factor of 3 between 1980 and 2018 
―after having been stagnant for the first decade of its neo-liberal reforms―, in 
China it did so by more than 20 times (and according to some sources by nearly 
30) –perhaps one can have too much of a good thing!   
In fact, in Latin America (with the sole exception of Chile during the 1990s, 
as mentioned above), the rate of investment has struggled to reach 20% of GDP 
since the beginning of economic reforms −less than half China’s recent levels; 
meanwhile, its GDP-share of household consumption, mostly the result of the 
exuberance of the few and the ever-increasing levels of debt of the many, is 
currently twice that of China.  Needless to say, both China and Latin America 
(and none more than Brazil) now urgently need to rebalance their growth, but in 
opposite directions.  
With these levels of investment, productivity growth and product 
diversification, China quickly turned the tables on the European Union and the US.  
And this led wages to grow at such speed that the share of labour in national 
                                   
51  On this issue, see Boix (2003); and Palma (2019a).  
52  Chile, Banco Central (2020). 
53  Avdjiev et al.  (2020). 
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income has grown by more than 14 percentage points since 2007 (to over 60%), 
with the minimum wage growing in parts of China up to 20% p.a.  In Chile, 
instead, the labour share in national income has fallen during this period no 
matter how one calculates this share.54  
In Chile, the bottom line is that, rather than being invested at home, most 
of these funds were used by the capitalist élite to finance capital flight in the form 
of shifting productive capacities to neighbouring countries ―where there were still 
significant niches for their perennial rent-seeking drive.  So the assets emerged 
abroad, while the debts were kept nicely at home ―and with the implicit 
government guarantees to which they have become accustomed.  Whatever they 
say, the main aim of this capital flight is to widen their international portfolio as 
an essential component of their ‘exit strategy’; which, in turn, makes their 
distributional threats at home more credible.  They are in a win-win situation, 
while everyone else…   
This new ‘development’ strategy did certainly help deliver an odd political 
settlement during ‘strategy 3’, characterised by a combination of an insatiable 
capitalist élite, a captured progressive intelligentsia, passive citizens (at least 
until this most remarkable of social explosions in October 2019, led by new 
generations and the feminist movement), and a stalled social imagination, which 
was spellbound with the “absolute certainties” of the new hegemonic ideology.55 
One helpful component in all this was that in the Ibero-American tradition, 
societies are often run by huge state apparatuses of faceless bureaucrats 
prepared to follow passively whatever ideology is the order of the day ─no matter 
how economically inefficient these ideologies may be.  No South Korean, 
Taiwanese or Singaporean (Weberian-type) civil service here! 
In fact, a paradigmatic example in Chile of this Ibero-American “faceless 
bureaucrat compliance syndrome” is the way in which the ‘TPP-11’ treaty was 
negotiated by the relevant bureaucrats;56 they seem to be convinced that their 
professional duty is to be the compliant mandarins of the politicians on duty.  Try 
explaining to those bureaucrats involved in the TPP-11 negotiations (who were 
happy to concede endless new rights to multinationals ―and without any 
reciprocal obligation―, and to take the resolution of conflicts within the TPP-11 
from Chilean courts to newly created international Mickey Mouse-type courts), 
that for a country like Chile freedom is the achievement of autonomy, when their 
civil service incomes depended on their not understanding!  As Primo Levi wrote, 
the truly dangerous people are “…the functionaries ready to believe and to act 
without asking questions”.57 
In short, although in ‘strategy 3’ there could be only one distributional 
winner, a rapid (although decelerating)  rate of economic growth, gains from 
multiple asset bubbles and easy access to an almost unlimited amount of credit 
initially helped confirm the ‘trickle-down potentials’ aspect of the story in 
‘strategy 3’, and facilitated popular support for the unfettered-market-supremacy 
discourse.  So much so that in this scenario, right-wing parties were even able to 
win a democratic presidential election for the first time in over half a century. 
However, the élite did not have a high probability of winning indefinitely in 
‘strategy 3’, any more than it had in any of the other distributional games it 
played in Chile during this period.  As already mentioned, Benjamin stressed that 
all class societies are in a permanent state of emergency because rulers are 
                                   
54  https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2017/november/measuring-labor-share-
latin-american-countries 
55  Palma (2014). 
56  See https://ciperchile.cl/2018/03/09/el-tpp-11-el-gobierno-saliente-y-la-utopia-
invertida/ 
57  https://newrepublic.com/article/119959/interview-primo-levi-survival-auschwitz. 
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always under threat; so, from time to time, the oligarchy has to ‘update’ its 
strategies of power (including important aspects of its own ideology) to counter 
those recurrent threats that endanger their domination.  Thus, the military 
dictatorship was not sustainable in the long run (not least because not even the 
stomach of the oligarchy could digest such horror and vulgarities for ever); and 
the oligarchy’s support for the post-dictatorship progressive distributional policies 
was, by definition, temporary.   
In turn, ‘strategy 3’ was no different ―and not just because ‘you can fool 
some of the people all of the time, but you can't fool all of the people (that there 
is no alternative) all of the time’.  Also, the inevitable deceleration of growth 
(particularly productivity growth) in a ‘cosy scenario’, such as ‘strategy 3’ ―if 
only capitalists really understood what capitalism is all about!― and the 
excessive-greed-at-the-top that restricted the trickle-down played a crucial role in 
this.  The social burst of discontent in October 2019 finally sent ‘strategy 3’ to its 
resting-place.  It had achieved its goals (for the élite), but it had eventually 
become counterproductive, and the tsunami of discontent drowned it.   
The natural limitation of a ‘cosy’ strategy of this type (capitalism without 
compulsions) is that the capitalist elite starts taking “cosiness” for granted; so, 
investment, product diversification, technological absorption, productivity growth 
and so on, become optional extras (see Figure 8 below).  Their huge share of 
national income becomes a mere source of enjoyment (which includes the 
financial casino and capital flight), rather than the fuel that powers new engines 
of productivity growth. 
Keynes (1919), for example, explains the contrast at the end of the 19th 
Century between the ‘emerging’ economies of the time, Germany and the US, vs. 
‘mature’ Britain during the (investment-intensive) Third Technological Revolution, 
or third great surge of industrialization ─ that of the ‘Age of Steel, Electricity and 
Heavy Engineering’58:  
The new rich of the nineteenth century …preferred the power which investment 
gave them to the pleasures of immediate consumption.… Herein lay, in fact, the 
main justification of the capitalist system. If the rich had spent their new wealth on 
their own enjoyments, the world would long ago have found such a régime 
intolerable. 
 
Intolerable indeed!  At least this is the main message from Chile’s 2019 social 
unrest, as there is little danger of finding these enlightened attributes in the 
newly rich anymore.  
In fact, this “discreet charm” of Latin American-style bourgeoisie has now 
spread throughout the Western World.  We are all now indeed converging, but we 
are doing so towards features typical of Latin-style middle-income countries, such 
as mobile élites creaming off the rewards of economic growth, and “magic realist” 
politics that lack self-respect if not originality.   









                                   
58  For a comprehensive analysis of this period, see Pérez (2002).  
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FIGURE 7 
Chile: from 1 to 3.  Changing levels of inequality as a result of the 
élite’s changing distributional strategies, 1957-2010 
 
● 1=election of President Allende; 2=Pinochet’s coup d’état as ‘strategy 1’ (the 
inequalising-terror); 3=Pinochet’s calling (and losing) the 1988 plebiscite; 4=first 
democratic government (centre-left coalition); 5, 6 and 7=next three centre-left 
governments (and the emergence of ‘strategy 3’).  st.=strategy.  3-year moving 
averages.59 
● Source: as in Figure 4.   
 
In turn, figure 8 shows the consequences of the above-mentioned Achilles heel of 
“cosy” capitalism: cosiness for the elite and dynamic markets does not mix well!  
Neither does ‘cronyism’ ―the ever closer and mutually advantageous 
relationships between business leaders and ‘new’ left government officials, 
transforming ‘strategy 3’ into an extreme version of North’s ‘limited access order’ 
capitalism.60   
                                   
59  For a video explaining the Palma ratio as a new inequality index (published online by 
the Washington Post), see http://uncounted.org/palma/.  See also 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wY9XFQA-McA&feature=youtu.be.  Following the logic 
of the Palma ratio, the World Bank (2016) coined a related statistic, the “Palma premium” 
—an index resembling the first derivative of the Palma ratio (as this primarily tells us 
about its direction of change in inequality).  Also, as in econometrics the use of the Gini as 
dependent variable leads to misspecification and endogeneity, some new econometric work 
has substituted this index for the Palma ratio.  The main problem of using the Gini as 
dependent variable is that a regression would then attempt to explain with the same set of 
explanatory variables two very different distributive dynamics ―the homogeneity in the 
middle and upper-middle vs. the heterogeneity at the tails―, and this would be a 
specification error (Palma, 2019a).  For other critique of the Gini, see Atkinson (1970); De 
Maio (2007); and Martín-Legendre (2018). 
60  North et al.  (2007). 
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FIGURE 8 
Chile: GDP, employment and productivity, 1950-2019 
 
● Each series is an index number (in log-scale), with base 1 in 1950 for productivity, 2 for 
employment, and 3 for GDP.  DE=“dual-extractive” model (as I call the development 
strategy followed by Chile since its neo-liberal economic reforms)61; ISI=import 
substituting (or state-led industrialisation); Productivity=output per worker.  3-year 
moving averages. 
● Source: GGDC (2020; US$2018, PPP). 
 
Figure 8 confirms the idea that although neo-liberalism may well have become 
one of the most effective technologies of power ever, it had its Achilles heels: its 
preference for both an economic scenario in which there were few market 
‘compulsions’, and for an emasculated State. These market failures took away 
key drivers of productivity growth.  
                                   
61  See Palma (2019b).   
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If capitalism is what you want, as Keynes insisted, you must save it from 
this type of capitalists by implementing a progressive nationalist development 
agenda that seeks to inject dynamism by exercising different forms of state 
agencies to “discipline” the capitalist élite into investing their huge share of 
national income productively.62  This is the key to emerging Asia’s success!  But 
in Chile there was no progressive nationalist development agenda in sight!  Just a 
mild and short-lived attempt at the beginning of the second presidential term of 
Michelle Bachelet, nicknamed “la retroexcavadora” (the ‘backhoe’), which proved 
almost as short-lived as a mayfly…   
 As this figure shows, the deceleration of GDP growth during ‘strategy 3’ 
was almost entirely due to the collapse of productivity growth (from an average 
of 3.9% per annum to just 0.4%); that is, to the point that employment creation 
(mostly in traditional service sectors and construction, which accounted for 80% 
of the labour force, and with their traditionally low potentials for long-term 
productivity growth) became ‘cosy’ capitalism’s only driver of GDP growth.   
The political and economic impact of this was overwhelming, proving 
Krugman (1994) right: although “productivity isn't everything, in the long run it is 
almost everything”.  So much so that when the country inevitably ran out of 
cheap labour (traditional services and construction had demanded cheap labour 
at a rate between two to three times higher than Chile’s low rate of population 
growth), the capitalist élite faced a historic crossroad, which was exactly the 
same as the one that every current developed country had faced at a similar level 
of development: it could confront the lack of cheap labour by updating its 
development strategy ―in the case of Chile, by updating its dual-extractive 
model by searching for new engines of productivity growth, such as the 
industrialisation of commodities or a green new deal.  Or it could just search for 
‘more of the same’ by lobbying for ‘a refill’ of Chile’s unskilled labour mark ―i.e., 
a new policy of mass immigration of cheap labour from neighbouring countries.  
No prizes for guessing what happen next…   
The point here is that the mass influx of immigrants that followed (so far 
equivalent to about 10% of the labour force) was generated by a Chilean “pull”, 
not by an external “push” ─i.e., it started with deliberate changes in immigration 
policy, not with political disturbances in neighbouring countries.  And most 
immigrants came legally, by plane into Santiago’s main airport (often on specially 
chartered flights), in a way that ended up being a paradise for human trafficking 
gangs, who organised the logistics, the transport, the paperwork, and then 
profited from the horrific conditions in which many of these immigrants ended up 
living in Chile.  All immigrants needed to get a tourist visa when arriving in Chile 
was the return plane ticket, an identity document, and a little bit of cash (to 
prove that they were “tourists”) ―all of which were often provided by the 
trafficking gangs. Then, a labour contract would suffice to obtain a work permit 
and a temporary resident permit ―again, a contract that was often provided by 
the same gangs. 
Moreover, no one pushing for the new immigration policy seemed to have 
worried about the complete lack of spare capacity in housing, health service, 
public education, transport, and all those basic services that would be desperately 
needed by these immigrants.63  Cheap labour has to be cheap!  So, with the 
cheap-labour-intensive model with (practically) no productivity-growth being 
given a new lease of life, ‘more of the same’ growth via just employment creation 
was on the cards.  As Voltaire had emphasised (see epigraph), the comfort of the 
rich (including in the production sphere) depends upon an abundant supply of the 
poor.   
                                   
62  On how Korea did this during its process of industrialisation, see Chang (1993).   
63  Palma (2019b).   
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However, it was precisely this ‘more of the same’ that meant the neo-
liberal model was totally unable to update itself when its existing engines of 
growth (mere extraction of commodities and cheap services) had run their course. 
“Cosy” cum ‘crony’ capitalism ―an its limited access order―, had become self-
destructive.  The oligarchy has no one but itself to blame for ‘strategy 3’ having 
become counterproductive for their own interests. 
This lethargy of insisting on doing just ‘more of the same’ regardless 
reminds us of Conrad novels where, as in so many sea stories, the main enemy of 
creativity is stasis.  It is, in fact, the deadliest thing of all.64  
Finally, and as opposed to what household surveys indicate, new pre-tax 
data indicate that ‘strategy 3’ was far more distributionally successful for top 
earners than it had been reported so far ―casting further doubts on Chile’s 
supposed declining inequality.  (Figure 9). 
FIGURE 9 
Chile: shares of pre-tax income of the top 1% and top 10%, and 
the Palma ratio of post-tax and transfers income, 2000-2019 
 
● t.=transfers.  Circles indicate years when the Casen household survey was 
carried out; squares indicate presidential periods.  
● Source: WID (2020), based on De Rosa et al. (2020), for top 1% and 10%; and Palma 
(2019a) for Palma ratios.  
 
As the figure suggests, ‘strategy 3’ did help the top 1% and 10% keep their 
income-share stable at a level still similar to where Pinochet left them; which now 
are even higher than Brazil’s (see Figure 3 above).  Furthermore, it is difficult to 
believe that in a country with such a low and regressive system of taxation, the 
widely reported drop of the shares of post-tax income at the top is anything but 
                                   
64  Segal (1997). 
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the growing inability of household surveys to capture the income of the rich in 
this growingly financialised ―and fiscal paradised world. 
And if the share of the top remained basically stable, a drop in the Palma 
ratio of the speed shown in Figure 9 (especially towards the latter period of 
Ricardo Lagos’ presidency; see question mark in the figure) would have required 
an increase of the share of the bottom 40% of about twice the level reported in 
these surveys.   
Therefore (as in the case of Brazil in Figure 3 above), there is plenty of 
room for scepticism regarding the much publicised supposed decline in Chile’s 
inequality.  
In sum, ‘strategy 3’ may well have become an abject failure in productivity 
matters (ending practically in a ‘Ricardian-type’ stagnation; see Figure 8); it was 
nevertheless remarkably successful in distributional matters for the rich ―until an 
outburst of popular discontent put a sudden end to it with a display of social 
power not seen in Chile since the one that defeated Pinochet in his 1988 
plebiscite.  The power of the young (enraged by the hopeless future on offer 
under this strategy), and the feminist moment (which had had enough of gender 
abuse at every level)65, broke the neo-liberal ideological spell: the (‘there is no 
alternative’) emperor had no clothes.  
 
7.- ‘Strategy 4’: from the ideological narcissism of ‘strategy 
3’ to the élite’s sudden need to idealise the European ‘new’ 
social democracy  
Although this new distributional switch clearly involves many issues, there can be 
little doubt that the key one is economic reality catching up with the lack of 
productive dynamism of (‘cosy’ and ‘crony’) ‘strategy 3’.  Also, new technologies 
of social communication have helped improve social cohesion among the majority.  
Previously, the elite’s greater capacity for collective action gave it the upper hand 
in games of chicken; but new technologies of communications, as the social 
unrest in Chile demonstrates, became a game changer for the majority!  
The explosion of social unrest in October 2019 was quickly followed by the 
emergence of the pandemic, which provided a distraction from the social 
discontent.  However, as poverty and unemployment grew rapidly, while the 
centre-right business-friendly government struggled to respond, this distraction 
did not last.  In turn, insult was added to injury as almost all the great fortunes 
continued to expand as in the best of time, helped by the “perpetual mania” of 
the financial casino (Palma, 2020b).  When the plebiscite to change Pinochet’s 
Constitution took place in October 2020, it gained 80% support.  
From the perspective of this work, one of the key impacts of the pandemic 
was to throw all kinds of inequalities into stark relief.  For example, while in a 
middle-class neighbourhood (Ñuñoa) the two main reasons for requesting a 
circulation permit during the quarantine were for people to go to a supermarket 
and to walk their (pedigree) dogs, in a popular neighbourhood (La Pintana) these 
were for attending funerals and visiting relatives in penal facilities.  In addition, 
the low levels of internet coverage in the latter, just 13%, forced people to leave 
their homes even if they could otherwise have worked or studied from home. 
The combination of the explosion of discontent and the pandemic led to 
great anxiety among the élite ―and in many to an outright panic― that Chile 
would return to being politically unmanageable as soon as there was some 
resemblance of normality.  For a respected right-wing analyst, for example,   
                                   
65  Its slogan, “El estado opresor es un macho violador” (The oppressive state is a rapist 
macho) said it all (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tB1cWh27rmI). 
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The greatest fear […] is not the coronavirus, which will claim many lives, but it will 
pass […].  Nor is it the imminent economic debacle, which will also finally recover 
[…].  [The] greatest fear […] is an unmanageable social group that has abandoned 
the basic rules of communal life […].66  
 
Faced with these uncertainties, some politicians and business leaders began to 
idealise the European ‘new’ Social Democracy as a way out of their strategic 
impasse, hoping it might help reactivate economic activity while ensuring a 
minimum of protection and social peace (‘strategy 4’).   
For example, the presidents of both main business associations (The 
Confederation of Production and Commerce, and The Society for Manufacturing 
Development), contradicting everything that both business association had 
preached for generations (especially since the neo-liberal reforms), began to call 
for a European-style new social democratic model.67  Even some intellectuals 
from that political orientation began to publish their "Social Democratic 
Manifestos", to prevent "[…] future governments from going from [social] 
explosion to [social] explosion".68  The finance minister of Chile’s current right-
wing government expressed a similar opinion, and the main right-wing candidate 
for the next presidential election (a Chicago Boy and one-time Pinochet favourite) 
also, for the first time, defined himself as 'social democrat' ―and even in favour 
“of a new and stronger state [capable of] guaranteeing social rights”.69 
Not surprisingly, some on the ‘new’ left became really upset with this 
apparent infringement on their intellectual property rights!  
However, it is precisely the highly inefficient and probably unsustainable 
inconsistencies between the economic and social agendas of the European ‘new’ 
social democracy that made it so attractive for the élite (see Appendix 2).  In this 
new scenario, while a new social democratic economic agenda could still aim at 
delivering more of the same, a new social agenda could give a new lease of life to 
their now fragile neo-liberal model. Furthermore, they have an ace up their 
sleeve: in this financialised world, instead of having to pay for the extra social 
protection with new taxes, additional public sector borrowing can always save the 
day.  Therefore, for the Latin American business community, a switch to ‘strategy 
4’ could be another win-win situation: it could help re-legitimise its neo-liberal 
rentier model by making it a bit more civilised, and public bonds (instead of 
taxes) could finance the much-needed social peace and a minimum degree of 
equity.  How had this not occurred to them before? 
Basically, this would be a way to square the circle: powerful agents could 
continue to manipulate the product and financial markets at their pleasure (which 
includes continuing to extend the 'market' into hitherto unacceptable, even 
inconceivable, spheres of social life ―those that have already generated some of 
the most inefficient activities in the economy), and higher deficit spending could 
facilitate the “herd immunity” necessary for social peace. 
From this perspective, the new strategy makes complete sense, and the 
dwindling number of people within their group that still rejects it are driven by 
the self-destructive power of fundamentalism. The most attractive element for 
the more enlightened right wing is that this new alternative, together with 
offering a minimum of social peace and some equality, allows them to maintain 
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67  See, for example, https://interferencia.cl/articulos/entrevista-juan-sutil-desde-el-
punto-de-vista-social-probablemente-chile-tiene-que-avanzar; and 
https://kiosco.latercera.com/reader/03-08-2020-la-tercera?location=31 




the Buchanian aspects of their model, of which Pinochet’s Constitution and its 
"handcuff laws" are a paradigmatic example.  
For Buchanan (1993), it is big business who really needs "social 
protection", and their property rights can only be guaranteed by imposing 
constitutional guarantees.  Buchanan viewed society in a rather paranoid way, as 
in eternal conflict between "creators" (entrepreneurs) and “looters” (everyone 
else) who would have the former constantly besieged.  In his work he repeatedly 
warns of the danger of "parasites" and "predators" on the lookout for 
“innovators."  Therefore, it is the owners of big capital who actually need ‘social 
protection’, and their property rights could only be guaranteed by (Chilean-style) 
constitutional limits to change.    
Also, implicit in Buchanan is the idea that as part of their ‘social protection’ 
big business should have the privilege of being somehow above the law.  This 
idea has some resemblance to Carl Schmitt and Giorgio Agamben’s “state of 
exception”, except that it is not related to the sovereign's ability to transcend the 
rule of law, but that of a group in society.  Also, this ‘exceptionalism’ is not 
intended to be temporary: in the name of Buchanan-style understanding of ‘the 
public good’, it is intended to be a permanent state of affairs.   
One Chilean example of this ‘exceptionalism’: why fear prosecution, when 
—if convicted for (say) fraud— instead of going to prison one may be just sent 
back to university!  A judge recently sent corporate executives convicted of a 
major tax fraud on a one-semester course in corporate ethics (with the condition 
that they had to get a passing grade!).  The same happens in developed 
countries; in this ‘too-big-to-jail’ world, when HSBC became the bank of choice of 
Mexican drug cartels, or Standard Chartered of those on the official terrorist list, 
they just got a fine and no one went to prison.  In turn, when Purdue Pharma and 
other drug-makers encouraged over-prescription of opioids, leading to overdoses 
and addiction that according to US government data resulted in 450,000 
overdose deaths from 1999 to 2018 (half again as many people than all fatalities 
so far in the current pandemic), there was just a fine and no one went to prison 
―even if they agreed that they “knowingly and intentionally conspired and agreed 
with others to aid and abet” doctors dispensing medication “without a legitimate 
medical purpose”.70  Furthermore, the court had no problem with the Sackler 
family having transferred (often through questionable means) more than 
US$10bn out of the company between 2008 and 2017.71 
As a law professor states (commenting on how the Trump Administration 
spared corporate wrongdoers billions in penalties), “There’s no reason anymore to 
fear prosecution for committing serious corporate crimes”.72  In fact, in a 
Buchanan-style thinking this would not be just the mere exercise of state capture 
by big business, but something that has a perfect logic in the sense of untying 
the hands of “creators” and “innovators”.  
In Chile, as in the rest of Latin America, this influence of Buchanan also 
impregnated the ideology of the ‘new’ left; since the transition to democracy, 
they have spared no effort in apologising for their supposed "predatory" past 
(such as having been in favour of agrarian reforms, nationalisation of natural 
resources, and so on).   
This growing asymmetry between the economic and social agendas also 
took place within the Chilean Christian democrats; in the 1960s, its first President, 
                                   
70  https://www.ft.com/content/8112c484-c8f9-49f8-8d6d-bffeff9ccb59; see also 
https://www.ft.com/stream/e0c6c996-1c60-4ac0-8e96-ecb154217b20 
71  See https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-54636002; and 
https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-usa-opioids-litigation/mckesson-says-states-seek-21-
billion-from-drug-distributors-in-opioid-settlement-idUKKBN27J1UC 
72  https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/03/us/trump-sec-doj-corporate-penalties.html 
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Eduardo Frei Montalva, had an economic agenda which was closely articulated 
with its social one: agrarian reforms and the partial nationalisation of large 
copper mines went hand in hand with policies for social protection and social 
empowerment (the “Promoción Popular”, or “Popular Empowerment” policy).  
However, in the 1990s, during the presidency of his son Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, 
while the social agenda remained similar to that of Frei senior (although 
implemented with many more consultants), the economic agenda tried to build a 
future which was the exact opposite to that of his Father’s agenda.  And since 
these agendas pointed in opposite directions, they obstructed each other.  
And the support of most of the centre-left for these constitutional barriers 
that defend the property rights of "creators” is done regardless of the rather 
‘uncreative’ way in which many of these supposed “innovators” acquired their 
assets ―such as in ‘piñatas’ of public corporations and of natural resources during 
the highly corrupt neo-liberal reforms, piñatas in which access was restricted to 
courtiers of the regime (others need not apply).73  
The open question, of course, is whether in Latin America this ‘strategy 4’ 
would be as effective a mechanism for making a rentier neo-liberal economic 
agenda more acceptable as in Western Europe.  Political settlements of this kind 
are surely bound to be more fragile in the periphery than in the centre.  Also, 
perhaps ‘strategy 4’ came a bit too late in Latin America, just as the aristocratic 
concessions did in late 18th-century France.  Latin American oligarchies will surely 
need now some truly fancy footwork (and the appropriate ‘collective action’) to 
make this new strategy work! 
 
Conclusions  
This paper tries to answer the question why is it that the rich stay rich no matter 
what?  Is Latin America’s huge inequality (and in particular Chile’s) a reflection of 
a specificity of ‘fundamentals’ or particular interactions between power structure 
and choice?  Is its high market and disposable income inequalities the product of 
somehow ‘exogenous’ factors (as in most neo-classical analysis) or of complex 
interactions between political settlements and market failures?  How do we get 
through the veils obscuring these interactions and distorting our vision of the 
self-constructed nature of its artificially-high levels inequality?  Has neo-liberal 
globalisation-cum-financialisation broadened the scope for “distributional failure”? 
As discussed above, one key answer to those questions is that rather than 
thinking (as in most neo-classical narratives) about the possible concrete 
effects that well-known factors may have on inequality (e.g., technology, social 
mobility, education, and so on), it would be more illuminating to try to 
understand the concrete expressions that these factors may find in actual 
experiences of inequality, such as Chile’s.74  In fact, some of the pieces of the 
distributional puzzle may well be the same in different countries, but the way 
they fit together may well differ ―sometimes significantly.   
As initially discussed in my first paper, written while I was still a graduate 
student (Palma, 1978), and developed further in Palma (2016b), the analytical 
challenge in subjects such as inequality is not about building “mechanico-formal” 
theories, from where ‘general implications’ can be abstracted.  It is about 
developing methodologies for the analysis of concrete situations of phenomena 
                                   
73  See, for example, Mönckeberg (2015); Gárate (2012); and 
https://www.ciperchile.cl/2013/09/12/%c2%bfhow-long-to-wait-for-the-Chicago-boys-
associates-to answer-for-the-loot-that-some-took-away/ 
74 For a more detailed critique of neoclassical distributional models, and of their 
econometrics see Palma (2019a).  For other critique of the Gini, see Atkinson (1970); De 
Maio (2007); and Martín-Legendre (2018). 
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such as inequality ―in this case, for the analysis of Chile’s concrete experience of 
inequality.   
The question which we should ask ourselves is why, it being obvious that 
the capitalist economy tends towards a greater level of inequality (and this 
mainly because the élite has the option to construct several routes to get the 
upper hand in the distributional struggle ―rather than because of neo-classical 
issues such as “r>g”); why, it being obvious that we have embarked on a process 
of growing internationalisation and financialisation; that societies are divided in 
groups with antagonistic interests, and that the particular is to a certain extent  
conditioned by the general, why with these premises we have not gone beyond 
the partial —and therefore abstract— characterisation of inequality. 
A key lesson from the Chilean experience is the key role played by choice 
in inequality; for example, although Chile has the same GDP per capita and 
average wage as in Croatia (World Bank, 2020), it has a median wage that is only 
half Croatia’s (Duran and Kremerman, 2020).  Surely this is not so because some 
exogenous ‘fundamentals’ have forced Chile to have a much higher degree of 
wage inequality ―i.e., surely this is not the mechanical consequence of Chile’s 
abundance of natural resources, its levels of education, its particular problems 
with skilled biased technological change, and so on, but basically because of 
choice.  Choice in the sense that in terms of inequality there is no room for claims 
that we are just innocent bystanders at the mercy of ‘exogenous’ distributional 
forces.  This choice, of course, is not absolute but it is normally (although not 
always) taken within the parameters of the interaction between our history, 
politics and institutions with some of those fundamentals.  As already suggested, 
for an agency to succeed it needs to understand structure!  
For example, Chile spends twice as much as Croatia in education in terms 
of its percentage of public expenditure and its tertiary enrolment is one-third 
higher; spends nearly half as much in health in this indicator; has a much higher 
rating in Moody (A1 vs. Ba1), S&P (A+ vs. BBB-) and Fitch (A- vs. BBB-); has a 
much lower level of corruption; its State is less ‘fragile’, and so on, but its Palma 
ratio is 2,8 (and Gini 48), while in Croatia the Palma ratio is just 1.1 (and Gini 
31).75  Perhaps the fact that its rate of homicides (although very low for Latin 
American standards) is four times higher than Croatia’s is a much more telling 
indicator as far as Chile’s actual choice of inequality ―and of the way in which we 
articulate conflicts in general― than what rating agencies can tell us about both 
countries.  
Surely no ‘external’ force has compelled Chile (which such high middle-
income level) to have a median net wage not high enough even to bring a family 
of four above the poverty line, with nearly two-thirds of female workers in this 
position ―should we also blame gender discrimination on some ‘fundamental’, or 
external force? 
In other words, nothing reveals more transparently who we truly are in 
Chile as a society than the inequality we collectively choose to construct.  The 
bottom line is that in Chile we deserve the inequality we have.  And this it’s as 
self-defining an act as it can be! 
Another lesson from the Chilean experience is that in countries with such 
artificially created high level of inequality, most routes available to the élite to get 
the upper hand in the distributional struggle are associated with different degrees 
of economic inefficiency.76  Mostly (but certainly not entirely) because of this, 
these routes or élite-strategies sooner or later become losing games if played 
indefinitely.   
                                   
75  World Bank (2020); and Palma (2019a).  
76  See Figure 22 in Palma (2019a).  
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Therefore, the secret of success for the élite has been its flexibility and 
internally cohesion when playing their sequence of ‘losing strategies’ that wins 
―i.e., the Parrondo paradox.  Perhaps Chile’ greatest contribution to the analysis 
of inequality is that these phenomena have taken place in a fairly transparent 
form. 
In turn, as discussed above, from the perspective of the interaction 
between artificially-created inequality and economic inefficiency what’s happening 
in the high-income OECD indicates that they now seem almost infatuated with 
their process of “reverse catching-up” with unequal middle-income countries.  
That is, they now seem determined to mimic the Latin American distributional 
process by which (in a Ricardian-style) there is an artificially created shift in 
distribution from profits to rents, leading to a slowdown in productivity growth.  
Furthermore, given this squeeze in operating profits, capitalist are increasingly 
seeking to generate as much as their income via (also often artificially-created) 
rents as possible.77   
So, life is no longer that easy in the OECD now, with a family and a rentier 
oligarchy to support ―should I say ‘Welcome to the Third World’?  
If the above is the case, the relationship between inequality and 
underperformance would be an indirect one as both phenomena would be the 
outcome of a third factor: a distributional drive favouring rents at the expense of 
operating profits while keeping wages at best at a standstill ―even before the 
crisis created by the pandemic, real wages were lower than in the early 2000s in 
about two-thirds of households in 25 advanced economies —more than 500 
million people.  In the UK, for example, during this period real wages had their 
worst performance since the Napoleonic Wars.78  In turn, in the US average 
hourly real earnings were kept stagnant since Reagan’s election in 1980.79  And 
while the S&P500 was soaring more than 320% between 2009 and mid-2018 
―the longest bull market on record, which created more than US$18tn of 
(virtual) wealth―, the median US household wealth was actually falling.  @And as 
monetary authorities in the OECD ―the “new alchemists”― now think that their 
main aim in life is to make sure that ‘the rich stay rich’, bull markets have 
become schizophrenically detach from investment: if the US had continued with 
the same share of investment-to-GDP as pre-Reagan, over US$ 1 trillion more 
would be invested per year.80  In fact, net private investment all but 
disappeared.81  As in a fitting “reverse catching-up” with Latin America, now in 
the high-income OECD the higher the share of income appropriated by the top, 
the lower the proportion of that income that is returned to the economy in a 
productive manner.   
The analytical challenge, therefore, is to understand the mechanisms 
which help the rentier to get the upper hand in highly unequal middle income 
countries, such as Latin America ―and now in the high-income OECD as well―, 
and the specificities of this phenomena in each historical circumstance ―where, 
as Chile indicates, history, politics and institutions will undoubtedly play a crucial 
role.  
The key point here is that on the subject of inequality, what matters most 
is taking responsibility for our distributional choices.  Certainly, no 
‘exogenous’ force has forced the OECD to ‘bananise’ its market inequality ―and 
                                   
77  For the current role of financial markets and monetary authorities in helping rentiers (in 
the form of shareholders and executives) getting the upper hand in non-financial 
corporations, see Palma (2020b). 
78  Palma (2019a), and McKinsey Global Institute (2017).  
79  Palma (2020b).  
80   Ibid.  
81  US Bureau of Economic Analysis (2020).   
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with it, its economic performance (see Appendix 2).  Surely it is their choice, and 
as self-defining an act as it can be! 
As for Latin America’s “Southern-style” distributional scenario, it has so far 
proved to be something resembling a stationary process: no matter what the rest 
of society has thrown at the oligarchy, their ‘jogo de cintura’ has been up to the 
task.  Therefore, so far the impact of shocks (no matter how huge) have had a 
short-lived impact (one that has declined over time). 
 And this ‘stationary process’ has also spread to our imagination and 
culture, as Latin America is now a region whose critical social imagination has 
stalled, changing from a post-War prolific period to an intellectually barren one 
since the 1980s reforms.  Of course, it could be argued that what happened in 
Latin America is not really that different from what has happened in the rest of 
the world post-1980, both developed and developing.  One could even argue that 
the demise of critical thinking has spread around the world almost as a pandemic, 
transforming critical thinkers into an endangered species.  The specificity of Latin 
America is that the downswing of this cycle of critical thinking has been 
particularly pronounced.  
From this perspective, we have been left with both an oligarchy which is 
only interested in cleverly switching between distributional strategy (so as to 
construct a winning distributional game), and an intellectually stationary ‘new’ left 
that refuses to understand that in order to develop more sophisticated 
technologies of power it needs more sophisticated forms of knowledge.  This is 
particular so in the economic sphere, where their choice of monotonously 
repeating ‘more of the same’ after the transition to democracy has proved to be 
counterproductive for their aspiration of becoming a hegemonic force.  In short, 
they have been unable to build a proper identity via a successful “discursive 
articulation” between their economic beliefs and a reality inhabited by a plurality 
of agents and struggles. 
Thus, in this “Gatopardian” stationary mode, everything has been allowed 
to change (e.g., the transition to democracy) so that everything that mattered 
to the élite could stay just as it was.  Whether Chile’s October 2019 social 
outburst (now mixed with the pandemic) proves ‘a shock too far’ for its oligarchy, 
or whether it will manage, yet again, to pull another rabbit out of its distributional 
hat ―this time a social democratic rabbit― is Chile’s known unknown. 
The real mystery, however, is why oligarchies of this type can have such 
Muhammad Ali-style fancy footwork on distributional matters, while in economic 
matters they display the clumsy footwork of an elephant ―such as still being 
stuck in its glaringly obsolete 1970s neo-liberal model, one resembling the early, 
and most primitive, Washington Consensus.  If in one sphere they are the 
masters of “political articulation”, in the other they have shown the 
manoeuvrability of an oil tanker.   
A substantial component of the answer to that question, as discussed 
above, is that there are hardly any ways to reshape the structure of an economic 
‘system’ with so little entropy: in how many ways can one redesign the structure 
of its economy, so that it can move ‘forward in time’, if one can’t change the 
fundamentals of its status quo ― that those at the top continue to corner an 
enormous share of national income, while seizing the low-hanging fruit they 
favour.  In other words, (as in Coleridge's Ancient Mariner) the oligarchy’s fancy 
footwork in economic matters is more problematical, as it is stuck with a (rentier) 
albatross hanging around its neck.  In this sense, as in FDR’s New Deal, what is 
required today ‘to move forward in time’ is not only a new set of Keynesian 
economic policies, but also a package of institutional reforms able to change the 
whole environment in which economic activity takes place.  
Regarding their distributional strategies, perhaps the Latin American 
capitalist elite have now set themselves too ambitious a challenge: how to retain 
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a lion’s share of national income while ensuring that their rentier (and ever more 
inefficient) economic agenda is sustainable in time, as the majority are now 
prepared to challenge them credibly.  Perhaps through ‘strategy 4’ —and its 
idealisation of the European ‘new’ social democracy— they might overreach, and 
despite their skills and experience, their “fancy footwork” may fall flat.  
Furthermore, this time the help of the ‘new’ left is not as useful as it was 
during ‘strategies 2’ and ‘3’, as this group has lost most of its political clout.  And 
as Adorno (1951) remind us, this is no minor point as domination is so much 
more effective when “… it can delegate the ... violence on which it rests to the 
dominated”. 
Basically (and as I analyse in Palma, 2020a), in Latin America both the 
élite and the majority are now trapped in what I have called a “Gramscian 
Moment”, when the old fades, but the new fails to be born.  That is, when élite 
loses its legitimacy (and with it, capacity to get the upper hand), and alternative 
discourses are unable to gather sufficient credibility.  In this interregnum, as 
Gramsci (1930) warned us from his cell in a Mussolini’s jail ―and as many in 
Latin America are experiencing themselves, especially in Brazil―, it is almost 
inevitable that in the intervening time “there will appear a wide variety of harmful 
symptoms”.  For Gramsci, a strong hegemony is fundamental for states to move 
forward ―the lack of it makes societies resemble drifting boats!82   
In sum, had the Latin American élite’s plasticity of imagination in 
distributional matters been replicated in the economic sphere ―as opposed to 
being translated into a mere compulsive rent-seeking drive―, its economy (and 
more) would not be trapped ever deeper in the quicksand of inertia ―my 
definition of a “middle-income trap”―, of which Chile is a paradigmatic case.83   
The Freudian opposition between the creativity inbuilt in the instinct 
toward survival and the innate self-destructive drive of human beings seem to 
play out rather transparently in the spheres analysed in this paper ―namely, in 
the recurrent conflict between the Latin American élite's remarkable “ability to 















                                   
82  Joseph (2002). 
83  Palma (2019b). 
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Appendix 1 
The Latin American ‘new’ Left 
As suggested above, what is crucial to my narrative is that on top of the usual de 
facto political power that the capitalist élite has from asset concentration, from 
lobbying power, from being able to solve its own problems of ‘collective action’, 
from its skills at building political alliances with the middle, and so on, an 
important component of its distributional success has been its remarkable 
capacity to build hegemonic consensuses around its own interests.  The ‘new’ left 
is just one of its casualties.   
In Latin America and many other parts of the world the ‘new’ Left is 
characterized by having concluded (a little too eagerly) that, with current 
domestic and international constraints, it would not be possible to assemble the 
necessary social constituencies for progressive political agendas. 
The history of the global South teaches us that this type of agenda 
requires a sufficiently strong domestic constituency behind it in order to be able 
simultaneously to take on all the ‘usual suspects’ (in the form of international and 
domestic forces) that are fiercely opposed to it.  This constituency is required, for 
example, for the State to be able to impose East Asian-style ‘discipline’ on 
capitalists (and sometimes on workers) so as to be able to reach the low levels of 
inequality in the sphere of production found in countries such as Korea and 
Taiwan (see Figure A2.2 below). 
Although in some cases ―such as the paradigmatic examples of Mandela 
in South Africa, Lula in Brazil and Aylwin and Lagos in Chile―, centre-left 
coalitions in the South clearly had the opportunity to build such a large 
constituency, they nevertheless threw in the towel too easily.  So, they gave up 
their progressive economic agenda and abandoned the economy as the 
fundamental site of the struggle ―eventually conceding practically all the terms 
of the economic and distributional debates.   
In other words, as the ‘new’ left believed that it could not get political 
power to implement its own progressive economic agenda, it then tried to gain 
power to implement someone else’s agenda instead ―but more efficiently and 
with a human face.  It thus sought political power to implement de facto what 
Chico de Oliveira has called an “upside-down hegemony”.84  In short, neo-
liberalism, as an ideology, has proved to be such an effective technology of power 
that it has paralysed most of its opposition.  That is, borrowing from Kafka’s ‘The 
Silence of the Sirens’ (1917), the (inequalising) sirens have, up to now, had a still 
more effective weapon than their song, namely the (ideological) silence of their 
‘progressive’ opposition. 
Ultimately, according to Sartre’s concept of mauvaise foi (bad faith)85, I 
believe that a key component of the ‘urgent necessities’ argument used by the 
‘new’ left all over Latin America, but especially in Chile and Brazil (and also in 
South Africa, incidentally) to justify abandoning radical economic and 
redistribution policies for ‘prudent’ and ‘well behaved’ market-friendly ones, was 
as an exercise destined to deceive others as well as themselves into believing 
that the transformation of society had become the ultimate unacceptable risk.86  
                                   
84  Oliveira (2006).  On how the Latin American ‘new-left’ has lost its ideological compass, 
see also Palma (2014). 
85  Sartre (1993).   
86  For Sartre, 'bad faith' is the habit that people have of deceiving themselves into 
thinking that they do not have the freedom to make choices for fear of the potential 
consequences of making a choice. 
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Thus a key component of its ‘new-look’ pragmatism was never to say or do 
anything that might wake the socialist ghosts of the past.87 
When Mrs Thatcher was asked in one of her last interviews what her 
greatest political achievement had been, her answer was clear-cut: the 
transformation of the Labour party into the 'New Labour’ of Blair and Brown.  If 
Pinochet had had the brains to understand this, he might have said the exact 
same thing about the ‘new’ left in Chile.  It’s a good example of how neo-liberals 
succeeded in “manufacturing consent".   
The most telling sign of success at this, particularly in the economic 
sphere, as Žižek (2008) reminds us is when “one starts telling stories of others as 
if they were one’s own”. 
As I discussed somewhere else88, the current political project of the ‘new’ 
left could even be called an “inverted utopia”.  If utopia is that scenario in which 
it is not possible to do what one imagines, the opposite (the inverted utopia) 
would be when one is not capable of imagining what one is actually doing.89  And 
this relates to what is discussed above relating to the way in which the ‘new’ left 
did that necessary Gramscian ideological integrative effort of elements of 
opposing ideologies: instead of doing it in an imaginative and creative way, it did 
so in a lazy, often opportunistic mode, letting the new neo-liberal economic 
ideology simply replace its previous (‘post-war-type’) social democratic ideology.  
In other words, in an ‘inverted utopia’ scenario it is as if one gets detached from 
what one is actually doing ―especially in economic matters.   
Pascalian philosophy helps to understand this; what the ‘new’ left did was 
to pursue the ritual: pretend that you believe and credibility ―and belief― will 
follow.  That is, if at the beginning they did not really believe in the neo-liberal 
model, a rigid devotion to the liturgy would end up believing for them.  The key 
was not to mix what was done with what was said to be done.  What was needed 
was to detach speech from reality.90  And then create false dichotomies: either 
you were a mere ‘nostalgic of the past’ or an ‘absolute convert’.  Good sense 
would indicate what ‘should’ be done ―the secret was to do it with automaton 
regularity; thus routine would become credibility and credibility would turn into 
faith.  In short, do ‘as if’ you didn't know.  Undoubtedly, in this ritual there is an 
important element of pragmatism, but there is also the advantage that 
automatism helps to give up little by little previous convictions (almost) without 
realising it.  And, as Pascal's ‘materialist theology’ tells us, in the end automatism 
always ends up taking the mind with it!   
In sum, even if one were to agree with the ‘new’ left that there was little 
option in Chile during the transition to democracy but to accept a political 
settlement of the kind found elsewhere in Latin America and in South Africa, and 
even if one understands that part of this strategy’s logic was both to tell ‘stories’ 
to their base and to tell ‘stories’ to the capitalist élite and international financial 
markets (in order to conceal their initial reluctant acceptance of the neo-liberal 





                                   
87  See Arantes (2007).   
88  https://www.ciperchile.cl/2018/03/09/el-tpp-11-el-gobierno-saliente-y-la-utopia-
invertida/ 
89  See also Arantes (2007).  
90  Ibid.   
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Appendix 2 
A2.1.- The post-war social democracy vs.  the ‘new’ (post-
Thatcher and Reagan) “Third Way”  
In the post-war social democratic thinking, and even before the end of the war 
(as in the meeting at Breton Woods), there was one key idea at the centre of the 
analysis (which is exactly the same that is most relevant to Latin America’s 
current situation): the only effective way out of that disaster was to restructure 
to reactivate.  This implied the need for new economic and social agendas, 
which should be designed in an intimately articulated way, so that they might 
both be enhanced by their interaction.  This symmetry between the two agendas 
became the hallmark of this strategy, and one of its main strengths. Conversely, 
asymmetry between the two became the defining trait and greatest weakness of 
"version 2.0" of this strategy in post-1980s neo-liberal Europe. The economic 
agenda would point in one direction, and the social agenda in the other.  
 
A2.2.- The neo-liberal crosscurrents of the '70s  
One way to visualize the resurgence of neo-liberalism during the 1970s is that the 
stagflation post-73 awakened the destructive power of fundamentalism; those 
who worshiped unfettered market forces had been waiting for their chance to 
revenge on the previous success of the Rooseveltian-Keynesian “heresy”.  Neo-
liberals feared that that success could annihilate belief in free markets, 
threatening a return to a primitive analytical chaos that would destroy 
understanding and eliminate meaning.  
This fear brought into play the destructive instincts, since the worst part of 
the Rooseveltian-Keynesian heresy (and of structuralism in the periphery) was its 
indisputable successes in restructuring and reactivating the world economy after 
the war, both north and south of the Equator. 
For this reason, the challenge for neo-liberals was not to overcome 
Keynesianism creatively, but to erase every last vestige of its existence.  When 
the main ideologue of the Brazilian reforms was asked about the main aim of 
these reforms, he replied: "To undo 40 years of stupidity [besteira]".  Adding, 
"Now you are either a neo-liberal or you are a neo-idiot [neoburro]."  This 
attitude of ‘undoing stupidities’ ―of multiplying everything by "minus 1"― was 
what led these neo-liberal reforms to become an exercise in "non-creative 
destruction." 
According to the psychoanalyst Ron Britton, there is a direct relationship 
between the ‘expectation of understanding the real’ and the tolerance of 
dissent.91  The higher the expectations (as is often the case in natural sciences), 
the higher the tolerance of dissent; but if the expectations are low (as in so much 
of economic analysis), intolerance tends to be high.  The economic discipline of 
post-neo-liberal reforms is a particularly good example of the latter. The opposite 
is often the case of physics; Einstein, for example, would happily say that he is 
never quite sure that his picture was the only one which could explain his 
observations.   
Foucault's (1979) conception of the relationship between power and 
knowledge, particularly the role of economic ‘discipline’ in democracy —as a form 
of power that disciplines by imposing specific forms of knowledge— is helpful in 
understanding the role of the ‘experts’ in all this: as in Chile, they have become 
the praetorian guard of neo-liberalism.  Their pathetic role in a recent national 
debate regarding the withdrawal of 10% of private pension funds to help weather 
the decline of household incomes due to the pandemic is a paradigmatic example 
                                   
91  Britton (1998).   
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of this: they competed among themselves for the most apocalyptic prediction of 
what would happen if this was approved by parliament.  However, since they 
have been crying wolf for too long, nobody now pays much attention. 
 
A2.3.- The growing asymmetry between the economic and 
the social agenda in the European ‘new’ social democracy 
As suggested above, the fundamental problem with the European ‘new’ social 
democracy, unlike its post-war version, is that its new economic agenda became 
totally dissociated from its (more traditional) social agenda, as the former 
indiscriminately absorbed the neo-liberal economic discourse, while the latter was 
almost untouched by it. 
In addition, as both agendas remain stuck in the past ―one was trying to 
repeat it, the other to repudiate it― they ignored how a new technological 
revolution and international economic order made it necessary to rethink 
everything creatively.  The case of Germany is paradigmatic in terms of the 
asymmetry of the two agendas; what has happened to its market distribution 
says it all. 
FIGURE A2.1 
Germany and Chile on market inequality: a process of  
“reverse catching-up”? 
 
● Market-Gini=Gini before taxes and transferences; a=Pinochet’s coup d’état; b=Chile’s 
return to democracy; and c=German reunification.   
●  Source: SWIID (2020).  As unfortunately this source (or similar) does not provide 
information by deciles, it is not possible to work with the methodology of the Palma ratio.   
 
It is remarkable how the election of Reagan and Thatcher, and the fall of the wall, 
unleashed in the OECD a ‘reverse catching-up’ with the tropics, "bananising" its 
market inequality.  The Washington Consensus promised "convergence" around 
the world ―and not just in incomes, but also in institutions, inequality, and so on.  
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And distributive convergence did indeed occur, but it happened in the wrong 
direction! 
The difference between Europe and the US’s post-war social democratic 
economic agenda and the subsequent pro-neo-liberal one is that the former 
sought to generate economic dynamism by “disciplining” capital, so that the only 
way it could make money was by doing something socially useful ―especially at 
home.  In its version 2.0, however, the new neo-liberal theology ingrained in its 
“common sense” (Gramsci’s perspective) that the only way to generate economic 
dynamism was through keeping the rich happy.  The harmful impact this had in 
areas such as market-inequality is evident in the figure. 
Furthermore, while in Germany the market-Gini jumped by a third, 
investment fell by the same proportion (it collapsed from 30% of GDP to 20%), 
becoming similar to the average level of Latin America since 1980; and this 
obsession with “Latinamericanising” investment became a generalized 
phenomenon in the OECD.  Meanwhile, in Germany productivity growth also 
collapsed from growing at about 4% to 5% a year to almost zero ―again, to a 
level similar to the Latin American average since 1980.92  Not surprisingly, China 
turned the tables on Germany.93 
In other words, in terms of inequality, the ‘iron law of oligarchies’ seems 
to be that when one gets a Latin-style, artificially inflated market-inequality the 
greater the proportion of income appropriated by the top, the lower the 
proportion of that income that will be returned to the economy in a productive 
way.   
The US, in turn, also became more unequal in its market distribution than 
its Latin neighbour (Ginis of 51 for the US and 47 for Mexico); and with a 
President who only lacked dark glasses to look like another banana-republic 
dictator.  If the US had had the same income level as it has now, but the level of 
inequality from when Reagan was elected, the top 1% would be earning US$2 
trillion less than they do —a figure greater than Brazil’s GDP!  Meanwhile, the 
average real hourly wage has been stagnant ever since.  Linking this with the 
above mention issue regarding investment (that in the US over US$ 1 trillion 
more would be invested per year if it still had its pre-Reagan investment-GDP 
ratio), we find a clear “reverse catching up” in motion with countries at the other 
side of the Rio Grande. 
It should be no surprise, then, that when Pope Francis referred to modern-
day capitalism, he said that its “unbridled greed” is the "dung of the devil”, which 
creates a "subtle dictatorship", and also plunders nature.94  Also, when speaking 
about financial markets, he added that “A new, invisible and at times virtual, 
tyranny is established, one which unilaterally and irremediably imposes its own 
laws and rules”.95  
My criticism of the European ‘new’ social democracy is not so much for its 
attempts to absorb elements of economic neo-liberalism —after all, that is a 
matter for them to choose— but for its inability to do so creatively.  As 
                                   
92  Palma (2019a and 2020a). 
93  According to a Financial Times columnist, “Germany once saw China as an export 
market for machinery with which China would develop its industrial base. Today, China is 
becoming the senior partner in the relationship. [Germany’s] biggest problem is falling 
behind in the technological race. … [This] is symptomatic of a fundamental European 
problem. … [Now there] are signs that complacency is about to turn into panic”. 
(www.ft.com/content/19fd8544-3c2f-11e9-b856-5404d3811663). 






mentioned above, for Gramsci, every hegemonic ideology must absorb elements 
of opposing ideologies, articulating them with the essence of its own.  This is 
what Chile’s neo-liberal ideology did so brilliantly well after the 1988 plebiscite 
and the return to democracy, and what it is trying to do now all over again in 
‘strategy 4’ to ensure the critical mass of social peace needed so that everything 
could remain basically as it was (in a ‘gatopardian’ way).  
What happened instead to the European ‘new’ social democracy was that 
the effort to absorb elements of its opposing ideology was done unimaginatively 
and in a sometimes opportunistic way, letting the neo-liberal economic ideology 
simply replace the existing one. The result was an insipid economic ideology, 
which was totally disjoined with its more traditional social agenda.  
The crucial point is that Germany’s bizarre deterioration of market 
inequality was far from inevitable (or that in the rest of Europe, Western and 
Eastern). Figure A2.2 compares Germany and Korea.  
FIGURE A2.2 
Germany and Korea: market vs.  disposable income inequality, 
1960-2017 
 
● market= market-Gini disposable= disposable income-Gini (after taxes and 
transferences); a=German reunification; b=East Asian financial crisis.   
● Source: SWIID (2020). 
 
As the figure indicates, both Germany and Korea arrive at the same final 
destination ―i.e., at the same distribution of disposable income (Gini about 30, or 
a Palma ratio of about 1.2).  However, Korea almost get there already in the 
sphere of production, while Germany (to keep the rich sweet) chooses to follow 
a tortuous path: while it lets its market-distribution worsen by 14 Gini-points 
during this period, it then implements a redistributive policy of pharaonic 
dimensions so as to get to where Korea arrives without much redistribution effort.  
While in Korea the economic and social agendas point in the same direction, in 
Germany the two agendas obstruct each other. 
This is what I call the European ‘new’ social democracy’s “distributive 
failure”; and this failure is different from an increase in market inequality per se 
―which is a distributive failure in itself.  This new distributive failure relates to 
the increasingly inefficient, and surely unsustainable in the long run, reduction of 
market-inequality.  It relates to the ever increasing (and economically distorting) 
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gap between market and disposable income inequality, and the inevitable 
plethora of market failures, market distortions, transaction costs and increases in 
public debt associated with it.96 
The end result of this distributive failure is that the direct requirements for 
‘social protection’ in the European Union already represented 40% of public 
spending (the equivalent of 16% of GDP) before the pandemic.  Furthermore, if 
one adds public health and education, this total reaches two thirds of all public 
spending —equivalent to no less than 25% of GDP!  With the pandemic, of course, 
as inequality and the need for social protection have increased, this cost has 
soared.97 In the Eurozone, for example, the budget deficit has grown almost 
tenfold.98  
In sum, even before the pandemic, in Germany one out of every four 
euros of value added had to be allocated to social protection ―and mostly to 
reverse an absolutely unnecessary, inefficient and gigantic Latin-style market 
inequality.   
Pope Francis hits the nail on its head, criticising "a certain liberalism that 
believes it is necessary first to produce wealth [for the few], no matter how, to 
later promote some redistributive policy by the State".99  The key here is in the 
‘no matter how’ part of the quote; not only has Europe “Latinamericanised” its 
market inequality, but (as mentioned above) its financialised and rentier élite has 
done the same with investment and productivity levels.  If at least the ‘how it was 
done’ really mattered (i.e., without distorting markets), perhaps even that 
particular economic dynamic would not have been so inequalising and growth-
inefficient, and there would not have been such a need for social protection, and 
so the redistributional cost might not have been of such unsustainable dimensions. 
Korea, on the other hand, only needs to invest 11% of GDP in social 
protection to reach the same distribution of disposable income for which Germany 
has to spend more than double.  That is why Korea can afford two simultaneous 
treats: collecting 15 percentage points of GDP less than Germany in taxes, and 
also having double Germany’s level of public investment.100   
This is why the European ‘new’ social democratic welfare state has ended 
up de facto being a subsidy to market inequality, since such high inequality would 
not have been feasible without both the mammoth (and perfectly avoidable) level 
of taxation, and the explosion of public debt.  Apparently, social protection is a 
subsidy for the poorest, but in reality the biggest beneficiaries of this social 
protection are high-income groups.  This level of social protection not only makes 
such market inequality politically feasible, but also after the 2008 financial crisis, 
for example, the US and Europe spent US$1trillion on bank bailouts, and US$15 
trillion were injected via “QE” (quantitative easing) into financial markets so as to 
sky-rocket the net worth of a few individuals.101  Bringing us back to the already 
mentioned issue of the post-modern Robin Hood ( who not only robs the poor to 
give to the rich, but also robs the rich to give to the very rich).  
                                   
96  For a detailed analysis of this issue, see Palma (2019a).   
97  On the rapid increase of inequality during the pandemic, see 
https://www.ft.com/content/ab30d301-351b-4387-b212-12fed904324b; see also Palma 
(2020b).   
98  https://www.ft.com/content/5579361f-5aac-4cd3-9e93-190fffdc0baf 
99  https://www.lanacion.com.ar/el-mundo/papa-nid1772302/.  Emphasis added.  I would 
like to believe that the resemblance between his stress on the ‘no matter how’ part of the 
story, and my own emphasis on that particular factor in my work is not coincidental as one 
of his advisers told me that he had passed my work on inequality to him…  
100  OECD (2020a). 
101  Palma (2020b). 
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And to continue my comparison between Latin America and some more 
enlightened East Asian countries, while Korea spends the same as Chile in social 
protection (11% of GDP), with that expenditure it manages to get to a disposable 
income-Gini of 30 while Chile only manages one of 48.  Taiwan, meanwhile, 
spends even less, and reaches an even better destination.  And Brazil spends 
more than twice as much as Korea and Chile in social protection (although half of 
that is just clienteles subsidies to pensions, an amount that is larger than overall 
public spending in health and education)102, but only achieves a level of inequality 
in disposable income that is even worse than Chile’s (a Gini of 51).  As for Mexico, 
it spends and achieves little ―it spends less than 8% of GDP on this, and ends up 
with a Gini of nearly 44.   
Thus, Latin America subsidises inequality doubly: first, like Germany, it 
allows its oligarchy to distort markets at will; but then (unlike Western Europe), it 
only taxes at half Germany’s level, making it impossible to arrive at a more 
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